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ABSTRACT 
AN INVESTIGATION OF BANK LENDING PRACTICES 
TO TEST PORTFOLIO THEORY AND 
ix 
THEORIES OF CREDIT RATIONING AND CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS 
Christine Chmura 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 1993 
Major Director: Dr. Neil B. Murphy 
The purpose of this study is to consider the theoretical basis of 
commercial loan pricing. Is commercial loan pricing most representative of 
pricing to reflect risk in the Markowitz sense or do banks ration their 
loanable funds based on credit risk or expected long-term customer value? 
Alternatively, does each theory contribute to the explanation of loan pricing? 
Some of the pricing theories noted in this study have been tested at 
the aggregate banking level, however, few studies have been performed at 
the loan level. Moreover, the author is not aware of any study that tests 
which theory noted here best describes actual pricing practices for bank 
loans. In fact, DeVany (1984) and Goldfeld (1984) have noted that models 
of bank behavior have undergone little direct testing. Goldfeld 
acknowledges that the sparse empirical work in banking exists because 
much of the theoretical analysis is at the level of the individual bank where 
appropriate data are not available. This study overcomes that problem by 
using the loan portfolio of orie of the top 50 bank holding companies in the 
nation as a case study. 
X 
Portfolio theory, credit rationing, and customer relationships provide 
the basis for this investigation of how banks price commercial loans. 
Portfolio theory indicates that the risk of a particular loan as well as its 
contribution toward the riskiness of the entire loan portfolio provides the 
most information about loan pricing. Credit rationing, however, indicates 
that the contract interest rate an applicant is willing to accept acts as a 
signal of loan quality and predicts the bank's expected return on the loan. 
Finally, theories about customer relationships indicate that customer traits 
such as variability of deposits and length of the relationship play a role in the 
way banks price loans. 
The data used in this study are at the loan level and were obtained 
from one of the top 50 bank holding companies in the nation. Loan pricing 
procedures are examined by performing a series of cross sectional 
generalized least square regressions where the expected return on the loan is 
the dependent variable in each regression. The non-nested J-test and Cox­
test help determine whether any of the model specifications tested in this 
study provide significantly greater explanatory power in commercial loan 
pricing than the competing model specifications. 
The empirical findings of this study should be considered exploratory 
in nature because of its reliance on data from one bank. Moreover, these 
xi 
results assume that each of the models have been properly specified. With 
these caveats in mind, the results are consistent with credit rationing and 
customer relationship theories (Hodgman and Kane and Malkiel). Moreover, 
the nonested Cox-test indicates that the credit rationing specification used in 
this study provides more explanatory power with regard to loan pricing than 
the customer relationship specification. 
The regression of the portfolio theory specification provided 
statistically significant results, but with coefficients of the wrong sign. 
Contrary to theory, the results suggest that the expected return on loans 
increases as the variance decreases. In addition, the regression results do 
not provide strong support that loans are priced relative to the risk they 
contribute to the total portfolio. 
In a matter related to loan pricing, this study also found that 
collateralized loans are associated with a smaller expected return than 
noncollateralized loans. This finding is consistent with Boot, Thakor, and 
Udell (1991) who suggest that firms use collateral to obtain more favorable 
loan terms. 
The conclusions and implications of this study revolve around the 
illiquid nature of commercial loans which creates an inefficient market 
characterized by asymmetric information. 
In light of the scarcity of information related to potential commercial 
loans, it is not surprising that customer relationship theories provide some 
explanation of current pricing practices .. Certain aspects of a customer 
relationship, such as deposits and length of the relationship can provide 
banks with valuable information about the riskiness of loans. Moreover, 
relationships that cover several bank services may enable a bank to 
supplement thin loan margins. 
Finally, the support, albeit weak, of credit rationing can also be 
explained with asymmetric information. Because of adverse selection and 
moral hazard, there is a point at which further increases in the contract 
interest rate on a loan will lead to declines in the expected return to the 
bank. Beyond this point, the profit maximizing bank should ration rather 




Over the years, banks have been criticized for pricing the loans of 
their best customers too high and their worst customers too low. Indeed, 
Loan Pricing Corporation found that when 90 commercial loan officers 
across banks rated the risk of four loan cases, their ratings of risk were fairly 
consistent; but they varied from 50 to 200 basis points over the cost of 
funds on the suggested loan contract rate.1 Moreover, a survey of credit 
practices at 1 00 of the largest banks in the nation revealed that loan 
approval and monitoring processes are not consistent with the nature and 
type of risk in a loan. 2 
Loan pricing has important implications for the economy on both a 
micro and macro level. For the individual bank, proper loan pricing leads to a 
better allocation of funds and thus to higher profits. This is particularly 
important at the extreme ends of the spectrum. On the one side, low-risk 
borrowers are likely to seek out more efficient sources of funds if banks 
price their loans too high. In contrast, if the riskiest borrowers are 
underpriced, they will capture a larger proportion of the loan portfolio's 
'"Portfolio Valuation Handbook," Loan Pricing Report, March 1989, p. 20. 
2Sanford Rose, American Banker, January 28, 1992. 
2 
funds and will likely increase the volatility of the portfolio's returns. On the 
macro level, the proper valuation of loans contributes to a more efficient 
allocation of funds in the entire economy (Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990). 
The purpose of this study is to consider the theoretical basis of 
commercial loan pricing. Is commercial loan pricing most representative of 
pricing to reflect risk in the Markowitz sense or do banks ration their 
loanable funds based on credit risk or expected long-term customer value?3 
Alternatively, does each theory contribute to the explanation of loan pricing? 
Some of the pricing theories noted in this study have been tested at 
the aggregate banking level, however, few studies have been performed at 
the loan level. 4 Moreover, the author is not aware of any study that tests 
which theory noted here best describes actual pricing practices for bank 
loans. In fact, DeVany (1984) and Goldfeld (1984) have noted that models 
of bank behavior have undergone little direct testing. Goldfeld 
acknowledges that the sparse empirical work in banking exists because 
much of the theoretical analysis is at the level of the individual bank where 
appropriate data are not available. This study overcomes that problem by 
using the loan portfolio of one of the top 50 bank holding companies in the 
3Appendix B reviews the methods banks currently use to price loans. It finds that the least 
developed area of loan pricing involves pricing relative to the bank's total loan portfolio. 
•some empirical tests performed at the loan level are: Berger and Udell (1989) which 
considers credit rationing, Berger and Udell (1990) which considers collateral and loan quality, 
and Hester (1962) which looks at a bank's loan offer function in terms of the loan rate of 
interest, the loan maturity, the amount of the loan, and the likelihood of collateral. 
3 
nation as a case study. 
An understanding of the theories of commercial loan pricing is 
enhanced by a familiarity with the environment in which commercial banking 
exists. Therefore, Chapter II provides some background by explaining that 
credit markets are characterized by asymmetric information which presents 
borrowers with an opportunity to exploit lenders.6 In the loan proposal 
stage, lenders face the adverse selection problem of assessing the quality of 
potential borrowers. After a bank grants a loan, asymmetric information 
gives rise to the moral hazard problem of monitoring and controlling the 
behavior of borrowers. Yet, as Leland and Pyle (1977) have pointed out, 
financial intermediaries have arisen in response to asymmetric information. 
Banks have become information gathering and monitoring experts, which 
has enabled them to find investment opportunities among assets that 
otherwise would not be marketable (Murton, 1989). 
Chapter Ill reviews three theories that provide insight into commercial 
loan pricing: mean-variance analysis and portfolio theory, credit rationing, 
and customer relationships. Mean-variance analysis and portfolio theory 
indicate that loans should be priced relative to the risk of the individual loan 
as well as the loan's contribution of risk to the bank's loan portfolio. In 
contrast, credit rationing theories propose that banks price loans up to a 
maximum interest rate. Beyond that rate, banks do not loan funds because 
6Readers familiar with the literature that seeks to explain the reason for the existence of 
the banking industry can skip Chapter II without loss of continuity. 
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the adverse selection and moral hazard associated with relatively high rates 
offset the banks' increase in return. This theory, which has been developed 
along several different lines, indicates that rationing credit based on default 
risk is rational behavior for profit-maximizing banks (Jaffee, 1971; Jaffee 
and Modigiliani, 1969) and occurs because of moral hazard (Guttentag and 
Herring, 1984; Keeton, 1979; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
The final theory considered in this study, the customer-relationship 
theory (Hodgman, 1961 and 1963; Kane and Malkiel, 1965), suggests that 
because some customers contribute more to banks' long-term profitability, 
their loans are priced lower. Moreover, during times of expanding credit 
demand, customers who are not preferred might be denied loans so that 
funds will be available for preferred customers. Sharpe (1990), however, 
argues that information asymmetries cause high-quality long-term borrowers 
to become "informationally captured," and these customers are charged 
higher interest rates because of the costs of communicating the quality of 
their loans to other banks. 
Portfolio theory, credit rationing, and customer relationships provide 
the basis for this investigation of how banks price commercial loans. 
Portfolio theory indicates that the risk of a particular loan as well as its 
contribution toward the riskiness of the entire loan portfolio provides the 
most information about loan pricing. Credit rationing, however, indicates 
that the contract interest rate an applicant is willing to accept acts as a 
5 
signal of loan quality and predicts the bank's expected return on the loan. 
Finally, theories about customer relationships indicate that customer traits 
such as variability of deposits and length of the relationship play a role in the 
way banks price loans. 
Chapter IV describes the data and research methodology which are 
used to test the extent that these three theories affect commercial loan 
pricing. The data used in this study are at the loan level and were obtained 
from one of the top 50 bank holding companies in the nation. Loan pricing 
procedures are examined by performing a series of cross sectional 
generalized least square regressions where the expected return on the loan is 
the dependent variable in each regression. The non-nested J-test and Cox­
tests help determine whether any of the models tested in this study provide 
significantly greater explanatory power in commercial loan pricing than the 
competing models. 
Chapter V contains a presentation of the empirical findings which 
should be considered exploratory in nature because of its reliance on data 
from one bank. Moreover, these results assume that each of the models 
have been properly specified. With these caveats in mind, the results are 
consistent with credit rationing and customer relationship theories (Hodgman 
and Kane and Malkiel). Moreover, the nonested Cox-test indicates that the 
credit rationing specification used in this study provides greater explanatory 
power with regard to loan pricing than does the customer relationship view. 
6 
The test for portfolio theory provided statistically significant results 
but with coefficients of the wrong sign. Contrary to theory, the results 
suggest that the expected return on loans increases as the variance 
decreases. In addition, the regression results do not provide strong support 
that loans are priced relative to the risk they contribute to the total portfolio. 
In a matter related to loan pricing, this study also found that 
collateralized loans are associated with a smaller expected return than 
noncollateralized loans. This finding is consistent with Boot, Thakor, and 
Udell ( 1991) who suggest that firms use collateral to obtain more favorable 
loan terms. 
The conclusions and implications of Chapter VI revolve around the 
illiquid nature of commercial loans which creates an inefficient market 
characterized by asymmetric information. Within such an environment, the 
necessary information such as the default probability and recovery rates 
related to loans are difficult to collect and compile into a meaningful 
database. Methods to circumvent this problem have begun to appear in the 
literature and, in fact, the method used to measure the expected return and 
variance in this study can be used by banks as a starting point to more 
accurately access the risk of loans. Similarly, the pricing of individual loans 
relative to the bank's total loan portfolio is beginning to be considered by 
bankers, but development is in its infancy as well. 
In light of the scarcity of information related to potential commercial 
loans, it is not surprising that customer relationship theories provide some 
explanation of current pricing practices. Certain aspects of a customer 
relationship, such as deposits and length of the relationship can provide 
banks with valuable information about the riskiness of loans. Moreover, 
relationships that cover several bank services may enable a bank to 
supplement thin loan margins. 
Finally, the support, albeit weak, of credit rationing can also be 
explained with asymmetric information. Because of adverse selection and 
moral hazard, there is a point at which further increases in the contract 
interest rate on a loan will lead to declines in the expected return to the 
bank. Beyond this point, the profit maximizing bank should ration rather 
than loan its funds. 
The case study nature of this study warrants that care should be 
exercised in applying these results to the banking industry as a whole. 
As noted in Chapters V and VI of this study, however, observers in the field 
of banking have provided anecdotal support for most of the findings 
presented in this study. 
7 
Further research should be undertaken to investigate the manner in 
which banks price commercial loans. This study relied on bond defaults and 
assumptions about loan recoveries to determine the return associated with 
defaults. With some banks now compiling databases of historical defaults 
on loans, this study can be repeated when more specific information 
becomes available. Further study should also be devoted to the question of 
whether banks properly assess the risk of loans. In particular, do bank­
imposed risk ratings objectively assess risk, and does loan pricing account 
for the recovery value of loans in the case of default? 
8 
CHAPTER II 
THE NATURE OF COMMERCIAL LOANS 
Although commercial loans are a type of investment made by banks, 
they differ from investments made in the capital markets. Commercial 
loans, for example, are relatively illiquid and difficult to price while 
investments in capital markets are highly liquid and objectively priced in the 
market by the forces of supply and demand. These differences play a 
significant role in the way banks price and allocate their loanable funds. 
Because this study is concerned with investigating theories that 
explain loan pricing, this chapter lays the foundation for such an 
understanding by examining the characteristics of the credit market. This 
chapter begins by comparing the efficient capital market environment to the 
credit market environment of information asymmetries. The role of banks in 
commercial lending grows out of this environment and is also addressed 
because it sheds light on how banks solve imperfect information problems. 
Moreover, the role of banks provides insight into the tools and information 
banks possess that enables them to price loans. 
Asymmetric Information in the Environment of Bank Loans 
This section contrasts commercial loan markets characterized by 
9 
10 
asymmetric information with security markets that possess all relevant 
information. The problems of adverse selection and moral hazard that 
develop from asymmetric information are also discussed. 
Asymmetric Information vs. Efficient Capital Markets 
Security prices in efficient capital markets reflect those prices that 
would exist if all relevant information were available to investors (Fama, 
1970). In general, this statement characterizes security markets where the 
large volume of buyers and sellers and their access to information ensures 
that securities are properly priced. 
In contrast, bank loans exist in an environment of asymmetric 
information which makes them difficult to value. Moreover, because no 
objective market price exists for loans, bankers must use their information 
gathering skills to price loans relative to risk. 1 Borrowers, however, possess 
more information about the true expected return and risk of their projects 
than do lenders. 
This condition of asymmetric information gives borrowers an 
opportunity to exploit lenders. In the loan proposal stage, lenders face the 
adverse selection problem of assessing the quality of potential borrowers. 
After a bank grants a loan, asymmetric information gives rise to the moral 
hazard problem of monitoring and controlling the behavior of borrowers. 
'As noted by Murton (1989), the externalities and information costs associated with 
banking are market failures that prevent the economy from achieving the "first-best" allocation 
of resources associated with perfect markets. 
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Adverse Selection 
When a prospective borrower initially applies for a loan, the bank 
requests information about the firm's current and expected financial 
condition. Unsuccessful firms possess an incentive to be dishonest because 
if they withhold or falsify information about their past performance or the 
level of risk related to the project for which they wish to borrow funds, they 
might increase their probability of acquiring a loan at a more favorable rate. 
Given this incentive and credibility problem, banks run the risk of adverse 
selection: granting loans to borrowers who are poor risks. 
Because of the adverse selection problem, in which banks are unable 
to properly identify an applicant's true risk, some lenders might price all 
applicants as if they possessed average risk (pooling equilibrium).2 In this 
case, potential borrowers who are not fully rewarded for their low risk might 
withdraw from the market. This results in a social welfare loss if firms 
abandon projects that would have been profitable (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
It is also possible that potential borrowers with relatively low risk projects 
would seek out informationally efficient intermediaries from which to borrow 
rather than deal with uninformed lenders offering the value of average risk 
(Leland and Pyle, 1977). 3 
2For a further explanation of the problem of perceiving all as "average," see Akerlof (1970). 
31t is often said that banks charge their best customers an interest loan rate that is too high 
and their worst customers a rate that is too low. In fact, adverse selection predicts that this 
condition will drive away the best customers--a situation that is perhaps reflected in the sharp 
growth of corporate use of commercial paper that began in the 1980s. 
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Moral Hazard 
After a loan is granted, banks are faced with the moral hazard problem 
of monitoring and controlling excessive risk taking on the part of the 
borrower because the interests of the borrower may differ from that of the 
bank. This possible conflict of interests between lenders and borrowers is 
depicted in Figure 2. 1--an illustration similar to that of Guttentag and Herring 
(1984). As shown in the figure, the bank's minimum rate of return is 
determined by the borrower's collateral (K) divided by the loan amount (L).4 
The bank's maximum return is equivalent to full payment of the loan 
contract (Z) at the end of the contract period. Thus, if the borrower's 
investment yields zero return, the bank collects only the collateral, and its 
yield on the loan is K/L (ignoring collection costs). The highest return the 
bank can earn is the promised return which occurs when the borrower's 
investment return is (Z-K)/L or 
higher. By contrast, the 
borrower's return is -K/L if the 
investment does not yield 
enough to pay the promised 
amount. However, as the gross 
return on the investment, Rg, 
increases beyond (Z-K)/L, the 
Ree 1 1 zed R8te 
of l=let�rn 
Rate or RatlTn 
to Cred 1 tor 
"�---------?L-----� 
cz- ()tL 
Figure 2.1: Moral Hazard and Bank Lending 
4A glossary of symbols can be found in Appendix A. 
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rate of return to the borrower rises and is maximized at Rm/L. 
The riskiness of the loan affects the borrower and lender differently. 
For example, the interests of the bank and the borrower may conflict if the 
borrower prefers investments that are associated with the possibility of 
relatively high returns and high risk. As shown in Figure 2.1, the borrower 
accrues all returns in excess of the loan repayment, but the borrower's loss 
is the same no matter how far below the default point the investment 
returns fall. The bank, on the other hand, is indifferent to the amount of 
profits the investor earns above the default point, but is interested in the 
extent of loss if the investment return is less than the default rate. 
The possibility of moral hazard is likely to be higher in a firm whose 
business is failing. Such a firm has an incentive to take on higher risk 
projects because of the hope that the commensurately higher expected 
payoff will provide the added revenue needed for the firm to survive. If the 
firm's risk-taking is successful, the firm will survive and its loan will be paid 
in full; but if it is not successful, the firm will go bankrupt and the bank loan 
will go into default. 
Because of moral hazard, loan contracts generally contain restrictions 
and protective covenants in an attempt to ensure full loan repayment. 
Moreover, banks monitor loans by occasionally requesting financial 
information from borrowers and by reconsidering a firm's financial status. 5 
6These surveillance and monitoring activities of banks are called agency costs where banks 
are acting as an agent for their depositors' funds. 
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The Role of Banks in Commercial Lending 
A market characterized by information asymmetries complicates the 
loan pricing process because of the difficulties inherent in determining risk 
with limited information. The role banks fill in commercial lending, however, 
emerges from the need to overcome the problem of asymmetric information 
in the credit market. 6 Campbell and Kracaw ( 1980) suggest that " ... in a 
perfect market environment, intermediaries could perform no unique financial 
service that investors would be unable to reproduce as easily. "7 However, 
under information asymmetries, some profitable investment opportunities are 
essentially nonmarketable but the information gathering and monitoring 
expertise of banks enables them to find productive investment opportunities 
among nonmarketable assets (Murton, 1989). 
Most theories of commercial lending emphasize the abilities of banks 
to evaluate and monitor loans.8 These theories can be further divided into 
6See, for example, Boyd and Prescott (1986), Campbell and Kracaw (1980), Chan (1983), 
Diamond (1984), Fama (1985), Kane and Malkiel (1965), Leland and Pyle (1977), and Seward 
(1990). 
7 As an alternative hypothesis to the proposal. that financial intermediaries exist to resolve 
information asymmetries, Campbell and Kracaw (1980) suggest that financial intermediaries 
are portfolio managers who would earn a competitive management fee in an unregulated 
market. Under this alternative hypothesis, the U.S. banking system is a product of the 
regulatory environment. Therefore, problems surrounding information asymmetries are not 
critical in explaining financial intermediaries. 
81n a review of banking models, Santomero ( 1 984) found that explanations for the 
existence of financial institutions are approached from three points of view: 1) their role as 
asset transformers through diversification potential and asset evaluation, 2) the nature of the 
liabilities they issue and their central function in a monetary economy, and 3) their two-sided 
nature (assets and liabilities). Because this paper is concerned with the asset side of banking, 
only theories explaining commercial lending are reviewed. 
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two categories: theories that explain the role of commercial banks as either 
efficient or confidential evaluators and monitors of commercial loans. Both 
of these explanations involve resolving information asymmetries. 
Efficiently Evaluating and Monitoring Commercial Loans 
Banks can efficiently evaluate and monitor loans because they can 
diversify and access information that is not available to other capital market 
participants.9 These two concepts are treated in turn. 
Diamond (1984) developed a model in which diversification in the loan 
portfolio is key to a bank's net cost advantage relative to direct lending and 
borrowing. The model involves an ex-post information asymmetry between 
potential lenders and a risk-neutral entrepreneur who desires to raise capital 
for a risky project. Although the debt contract with which the entrepreneur 
raises funds involves costs, it is possible for lenders contracting directly with 
the entrepreneur to assume these costs by spending resources monitoring 
the results of the investment that the entrepreneur observes. 
If many lenders exits, the cost of monitoring may be large or a free 
rider problem may exist where no security holder monitors because his or 
her share of the benefit is too small. The free-rider problem is solved when 
a bank monitors on behalf of those who provide the funds (depositors). 
When participants are risk neutral, Diamond shows that diversification 
increases the probability that the bank possesses sufficient loan proceeds to 
9Chan (1983) has shown that financial intermediaries' role as informed agents leads 
investors to a higher welfare state. 
repay a fixed debt claim to depositors. When a bank's number of loans 
approaches infinity, the probability that the bank possesses sufficient loan 
proceeds goes to one and the possibility of incurring necessary bankruptcy 
costs goes to zero. Thus, banks efficiently monitor loans because of their 
ability to diversify. 
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The second way banks efficiently evaluate and monitor loans when 
asymmetric information exists is through their access to information not 
available to others. According to Lummer and McConnell (1989), banks gain 
access to this information by one of two methods: investment in 
information-gathering technology or access to private information through 
customer relationships. 
Information-gathering technology in which banks invest include such 
items as computers and software packages, data bases, and human capital. 
Two widely used data sources that aid banks in their identification of risk 
and price are Robert Morris Associates (financial ratio summaries for more 
than 95,000 financial statements) and Loan Pricing Corporation (pricing 
matrix created from over 6,000 commercial loans). Some banks also 
maintain extensive databases of their own customer's loan characteristics 
which loan officers can access to aid in their analysis. In addition, Altman 
(1985) notes that many large banks run extensive simulations of repayment 
and other measures of firm performance under alternative interest rates, 
general economic, inflation, and key variable assumptions in their financial 
17 
analysis of potential borrowers. 
Although current theory does not incorporate much about the 
information technology banks use, the literature has focused on the ability of 
banks to access private information through customer relationships. 
Theories generally suggest that banks gather information through a 
customer's deposit or loan patterns, and the private information they 
possess about their customers increases over time. In each of these 
theories, it is apparent that the marginar costs of monitoring are lower for 
banks than for other financial intermediaries because of the structure of the 
customer relationship. 
In their seminal article on the information advantages gained through 
customer relationships, Kane and Malkiel ( 1965) argue that when a bank and 
customer develop a relationship through loans or deposits, the bank is able 
to discern the quality of the customer.10 Moreover, the customer quality 
becomes apparent to the bank because the bank's ability to forecast the 
firm's future behavior is largely a function of the length of the relationship. 
Black (1975) and Fama (1985) emphasize only the deposit relationship 
between a bank and its customers to explain why banks monitor loans at a 
lower cost than that of other financial intermediaries. According to this 
scenario, the historical relationship of a borrower as a depositor provides the 
10Hodgman (1961 b) is credited with first noting the importance of the bank-customer 
relationship. In particular, he asserted that "Anyone who troubles to inquire of commercial 
bankers will discover that the deposit relationship of a loan customer is a primary consideration 
in determining the cost and availability of bank credit to that customer." 
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bank with information that allows it to identify the risks of granting a loan to 
a particular firm and enables the bank to monitor the loan at lower costs 
than other lenders.1 1 Fama provides two facts to support this contention: 
banks usually require borrowers to maintain deposits at its bank, 12 and 
banks are the dominant suppliers of short-term inside debt. 
More recently, Sharpe ( 1990) developed a dynamic theory of 
"customer relationships" in bank loan markets in which long-term bank-
borrower relationships arise endogenously because of the asymmetric 
evolution of information. According to this model, all banks begin with the 
same amount of information when a new firm seeks a loan because no one 
has information about the expected quality of the firm. The bank that loans 
money to the firm, however, learns more about that firm's characteristics 
than do other banks through the monitoring process. Consequently, as time 
goes by, the bank that loans money to a particular firm is in an increasingly 
better position than "outside" banks to evaluate the firm's future 
performance. 
Confidentially Evaluating and Monitoring Loans 
In addition to efficiently evaluating and monitoring loans, banks 
"Sanford Rose, an observer of the banking industry, wrote in the June 22, 1992 issue of 
the American Banker that small commercial borrowers transact between 50 and 300 credits 
and debits monthly, which enables a lending officer to easily understand the patterns of their 
commercial activity. He notes that checking account surveillance is much more difficult for 
large borrowers, particularly if they operate in several different regions or employ more than 
one bank. 
12This requirement has been relaxed over the years, particularly for a bank's largest 
customers. 
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provide an additional service through the confidential manner in which they 
treat the information they gather. Confidentiality is important for two 
reasons: some borrowers desire to withhold information from their 
competitors and some want banks to "signal" their firm's worth through the 
loan approval process. 
When firms acquire funds through public debt, they are required to 
provide information that some firms prefer to keep confidential.13 
Campbell ( 1979) posits that managers can preserve the monopoly profits for 
the current owners of their firm by using a financing source that will monitor 
its activities and yet keep the information confidential--banks fill this role. 
On the other hand, some firms may use banks as a funding source 
because banks signal to other capital market participants that the firm's 
project is of high value. This value, which is directly related to the 
asymmetric information problem, is explained in a theory developed by 
Leland and Pyle ( 1977). They reason that when firms try to sell information 
about their project directly to investors, concerns arise about the credibility 
of the information and adverse selection. Because it is difficult or impossible 
for some observers to determine whether the information is accurate, the 
price of the information will reflect its average quality and thus market 
13Some small firms, however, may be prohibited from obtaining debt in the capital markets 
because it is costly to provide the information required. Consequently, small firms might use 
banks to borrow funds because the bank pays the cost of information gathering. In fact, 
Blackwell and Kidwell ( 1 988) found that minimizing overall costs is the motive behind some 
firms decision to use private markets rather than issue public securities. 
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inefficiency will result--investments will not be priced properly and resources 
might not be allocated properly. 
The problems related to the transfer of information can be overcome 
by banks that gather information and buy and hold assets on the basis of 
their specialized information. Banks signal high value projects when they 
loan funds for a project because they back their opinions with investments 
of their own funds. 14 
Essentially, the intermediary causes a sorting of classes of risk. The 
entrepreneurs with projects that possess favorable risk characteristics wish 
to be identified so they deal with an "informationally-efficient" intermediary 
rather than with uninformed investors who would offer a price equivalent to 
the average level of risk. According to Leland and Pyle, the best risks are 
"peeled off," and thus the average risk becomes less valuable and induces 
the owners of the next best risks to deal with the intermediaries. This 
process continues until sellers of all types of risk sell to the intermediary 
except perhaps those firms with the worst projects. 15 
14Campbell and Kracaw ( 1 980) take this explanation a step further and demonstrate that 
initial wealth endowments resolve the moral hazard problem because they function as a 
guarantee of the reliability of the information when they possess a stake in the market large 
enough to override any incentive to misrepresent the information. This result leads to the 
conclusion that initial wealth endowments act as a barrier to entry in the market for information 
and as a general constraint on reliability. 
16Leland and Pyle also propose that an entrepreneur's willingness to invest in his/her project 
serves as a signal of the project's quality. They posit that the value of the firm increases as 
the proportion of the firm owned by the entrepreneur increases. The logic behind this assertion 
is clear: if an entrepreneur believes a project is associated with a high probability of success, 
then the entrepreneur will desire to own as much of the project as possible in order to accrue 
(continued ... ) 
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Fama (1985) reaches a similar conclusion when he considers what is 
special about bank loans that causes borrowers to pay higher interest rates 
than those on other securities of similar risk.16 He suggests that the 
comparative advantage of banks as lenders (over other financial 
intermediaries) involves their ability to minimize information costs because of 
the positive signal they send when they renew a firm's short-term loans.17 
The loan renewal process triggers a periodic evaluation of the borrower's 
ability to repay its low-priority fixed payoff contract with the bank.18 By 
renewing a firm's loan, banks send a positive signal to other agents with 
higher-priority fixed payoff claims who now do not have to duplicate the 
16( • • •  continued) 
most of the profits. This explanation may be important to bankers as they seek to identify the 
quality of an entrepreneur's projects. 
16ln Fama's model of banking, he considers only loans on the asset side and demand 
deposits and certificates of deposit (COs) on the liability side of the bank's balance sheet. 
Demand deposits are associated with a reserve requirement. According to the literature, the 
reserve tax is borne by depositors who accept a lower interest rate because of the special 
transaction services that they receive from the bank (such as redeemability for cash and 
checking accounts). Cds also carry a reserve requirement but provide no apparent transactions 
or liquidity services relative to commercial paper and bankers' acceptances--two securities 
whose yield and risk is similar to that of COs. In addition, the yield on COs and bankers' 
acceptances of the same maturity are almost identical and the difference between average 
yields on COs and commercial paper are trivial. Thus, Fama argues, that since COs must pay 
competitive interest rates, the reserve tax on the COs is borne by bank borrowers. Hence, 
there must be something special about bank loans that makes some borrowers willing to pay 
higher interest rates than those on the other securities of equivalent risk. 
17Fama also suggests that firms use banks to obtain funds instead of publicly traded debt 
because of contract costs--it is cheaper to give one agent (the bank) access to information 
within the firm than to produce the information associated with outside-debt financing. 
'8Banks generally are last or close to last in the line of priority among an organization's 
contracts that promise fixed payoffs. 
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cost of obtaining information about the firm.19 Bank signals are credible, 
according to Fama, because the bank backs its opinions with resources (in 
terms of a loan) or by declining resources (if bad loans are made). 
Summary 
Due to information asymmetries, banks have developed an expertise in 
efficiently gathering and monitoring information. This access to information 
enables banks to find profitable investment projects that would otherwise be 
unmarketable. Moreover, the confidential manner in which banks handle this 
information and the signal they transmit by granting a loan, provides an 
additional value to some borrowers who could obtain investment funds 
through alternative and perhaps less costly sources (see Figure 2.2). 
The information that banks obtain about loan applicants enables them 
to resolve information asymmetries and price loans. The unanswered 
question, however, is how banks determine loan prices and whether those 
prices are related to risk or some other characteristic of the loan. The next 
chapter presents three theories that provide greater insight into how banks 
might price commercial loans. 
'9James (1987) provides empirical support consistent with the uniqueness of banks and 
information-effect hypotheses. Specifically, James found that a statistically significant 
positive abnormal return accrues to stockholders of firms when they publicly announce bank 
credit agreements. Also, the announcement of publicly placed straight debt issues were 
associated with negative stock evaluations as suggested by the information-effect hypothesis 
(see, for example, Leland and Pyle, 1977). Lummer and McConnell (1989) and Best and Zhang 
(1992) have also found empirical support that the bank lending process transmits information 
to the securities market about the quality of the borrower. 
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Figure 2.2: A Conceptual View of the Market for Commercial Loans 
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CHAPTER Ill 
THEORIES ADDRESSING COMMERCIAL LOAN PRICING 
The purpose of this chapter is to use the following three theories to 
explain the factors that might influence the way banks price commercial 
loans: 1) mean-variance analysis and portfolio theory, 2) credit rationing by 
default risk, and 3) customer relationships. Although these theories were 
not developed for the purpose of explaining loan pricing, each implies a 
theoretical basis with which to test loan pricing practices. These theories 
overlap in some respects, but each implies a unique view of loan pricing. 
Mean-variance analysis and portfolio theory, which are reviewed first, 
indicate that loans should be priced relative to the risk of the individual loan 
as well as the loan's contribution to the variability of the bank's entire loan 
portfolio. Rather than increase the contract interest rate on a loan to control 
for risk, however, the theory of credit rationing indicates that some loans are 
denied because, beyond a particular interest rate, the additional risk of a loan 
outweighs the possible increase in revenues from the higher interest rate. 
Finally, customer-relationship theories suggest two divergent views of 
pricing. The earliest customer relationships theories propose that loans 
should be priced by the long-term profits that the customer is expected to 
contribute to the bank. Consequently, loan pricing takes into account the 
24 
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return expected from such factors as the volume and variability of a 
customer's deposit. One view holds that longer customer relationships are 
equated with lower priced loans. An opposing theory argues that long-
standing customers are priced relatively higher than others because these 
customers are "informationally captured"--unable to convince other lenders 
of their superior repayment record. 
Mean-Variance and Portfolio Theory in Loan Pricing 
Financial theory indicates that assets are priced relative to risk, and 
portfolios are diversified such that the expected return is maximized for a 
particular variance or the variance is minimized for a particular expected 
return. In terms of loan pricing, this theory indicates that loans should be 
priced relative to their individual risk as well as their contribution toward the 
total variability of the loan portfolio. 
Mean-Variance Analysis 
Mean-variance analysis indicates that the return and risk of an asset is 
represented by the mean and variance of its expected return (Markowitz, 
1952) .1 The mean measures the most likely outcome of a set of events 
1The mean and variance alone can be used to represent an asset only when the expected 
returns of the asset are normally distributed or if the investor possesses a quadratic utility 
function which describes risk-averse behavior. Nevertheless, the distribution of expected 
returns to the bank on a loan contract is skewed rather than normal because returns are limited 
by the amount of the loan contract. Some empirical evidence exists, however, that banks 
possess quadratic utility functions with regard to the rate of return on assets. Also, other 
utility functions are locally approximated by quadratic utility. (For a further explanation of the 
relevance of quadratic utility in mean-variance analysis see Elton and Gruber, 1 987 . ) In 
(continued ... ) 
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and, in the case of loans, is defined as 
N 
(3.1) E(R)=}: d� 
i•1 
where d; is the probability of a random event, R;, and N is the number of 
possible events. 2 Risk is defined as the variance of possible outcomes. 
Mathematically, the variance (VAR) is defined as the expectation of the 
squared difference from the mean: 
(3.2) VAR=E[(R;-E(R))2j. 
Banks do not use equation (3.2) to measure a loan's risk because of 
the difficulties in measuring expected return. Instead, banks use their 
information gathering skills to determine the loan's risk rating (a measure 
that reflects default risk or the probability that a lender will not repay the 
loan) which is used to determine the contract interest rate. 
The literature that considers loan pricing in terms of default risk 
suggests that the relationship between default risk and price is similar to 
that between the loan's expected return and the variance of the expected 
return. Flannery (1985) and Sinkey (1989) represent the relationship 
between default and the loan contract interest rate by first abstracting from 
1 ( • • •  continued) 
addition, Hester and Pierce (1975) note that banks are likely to be risk averse, either because 
their objective functions are convex in discounted future net income or because influential 
depositors and/or regulators encourage them to act as risk averters. 
2A glossary of symbols can be found in Appendix A. 
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resource costs such as overhead. The loan contract rate, i ·, required 
compensate the lender for the time value of money as reflected in the 
nominal rate of interest, i, and the probability of default, d. This relationship 
can be expressed as:3 
(3.3) ;·= (1 +i) -1 (1-d) 
As shown in Figure 3.1, this relationship is consistent with mean-variance 
analysis: loans that are perceived to carry higher risk are priced relatively 
higher than low risk 
loans. Moreover, the 
relationship is linear in 
the relevant range.4 
Portfolio Theory 
In addition to 
pricing individual loans, 
PI""'CCCC&DIII't.y O't" O.'f"aUI't 
portfolio theory Figure 3.1: Contract Interest Rate vs. Default Risk 
(Markowitz, 1952; Tobin, 1958) suggests that investors choose their total 
loan portfolio to maximize expected return for a given variance or to 
3 Jaffee and Modigliani ( 1969) show that this relationship is the first-order optimization of 
a bank's loan offer curve. 
4Historical data indicate that the spread between the loan rate and opportunity rate at 
which banks can obtain funds or invest funds is typically small. The implication is that banks 
will generally assume modest default risk because their interest rate spread restricts them to 
a small margin of error. If the cost of funds equals 5 percent, for example, and a bank prices 
a loan 50 basis points above cost, the price is implicitly assuming that risk is 0.0048 percent 
probability of default. 
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minimize the variance for a given expected return--an efficient portfolio.5 
The expected return for a portfolio of assets is simply the weighted 
average of the expected returns for the individual loans in the portfolio. 
Calculating the variance of the portfolio's returns is not as straightforward. 
It is the squared weighted average of the individual variances plus two times 
the weighted covariances between all the loans in the portfolio: 
N N N 
(3.4) VARP = L x�VA� + 2L L x�povii. 
j:1 i•1 j•1 
where VARP is the variance of the loan portfolio, VAR1 is the variance of 
loan i, COV;i is the covariance between the returns on loans i and j, and x is 
the fraction of the portfolio represented by the loan. The formula for the 
portfolio variance shows that, in addition to the variance of individual loans, 
the covariances between pairs of individual loans is incorporated in the 
variance of the total loan portfolio. The variance of a portfolio with a large 
number of loans can be stated as the summation of its weighted 
covariances: 
N N 
(3.5) VARP =2L L x�pOV;i 
i=1 j=1 
Thus, the contribution of a loan's riskiness to the total portfolio is 
determined by its average covariance with all the other assets in the 
portfolio rather than simply the individual loan's variance. 
6Hart and Jaffee (1974) have shown that the separation theorem holds for depository 
financial intermediaries. They also found that the efficient frontier space is linear. 
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In general, portfolio theory indicates that if a bank holds many 
different types of loans in its portfolio, it can achieve a lower variability of 
actual loan losses for the same rate of return. In other words, maximization 
of return at a certain risk level implies a diversified portfolio.6 The lower the 
correlation of return between loans, the lower will be the risk of the entire 
portfolio. Thus, portfolio theory implies that banks are not only concerned 
with the risk of a single loan, but with the loan's contribution to the 
variation of the total loan portfolio. Consequently, loans should also be 
priced relative to the bank's loan portfolio.7 
Summary 
Mean-variance analysis and portfolio theory imply that commercial 
loans should be priced relative to their individual risk as well as their 
contribution to the variation in the bank's total loan portfolio. According to 
this theory, price serves as the rationing mechanism. That is, when the 
demand for loans exceeds supply, banks ration some potential customers 
out of the market by raising the contract interest rate. 
8McManus (1992) provides empirical evidence that diversification can be a powerful force 
in reducing the riskiness of bank loan portfolios. · 
7 Applications of portfolio theory to bank loan portfolios have been limited because of the 
difficulty in computing the expected return and variance on loans. Appendix B considers in 
more detail the unique methods that several authors have proposed to apply portfolio theory 
in banking. In general, these articles propose that banks measure risk concentrations within 
their portfolio so that the pricing of new loans can account for the impact of the new loan on 
the variability of the portfolio's total return. 
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Credit Rationing by Default Risk 
Instead of pricing loans strictly based on risk, credit rationing theories 
posit that banks control risk by denying credit to the riskiest borrowers. In 
other words, banks price loans up to a maximum interest rate, which is 
associated with a particular level of default risk, and beyond that rate banks 
do not loan funds regardless of the interest rate offered by the potential 
borrower.8 Credit is rationed with asymmetric information because adverse 
selection and moral hazard increase the possibility that higher contract 
interest rates will be associated with losses that outweigh the expected 
return from the increase in interest rates. Therefore, credit rationing theories 
imply a nonmonotonic relationship between the expected return on the loan 
and the contract interest rate. 
Early Theories of Credit Rationing 
The earliest theories of credit rationing grew out of the availability 
doctrine9 which sought to explain the efficacy of monetary policy by 
8More precisely, credit rationing has been defined as an excess demand for commercial 
loans at the loan rate quoted by the banks (Jaffee and Modigliani, 1 969) because quoted loan 
rates are below the Walrasian market-clearing level (Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990). 
9The availability doctrine became prominent at the end of World War II when empirical 
evidence suggested that the accepted theory of monetary policy would not enable the Federal 
Reserve Board to effectively carry out its policies. At the time, it was believed that for 
monetary policy to be effective, real expenditure decisions needed to be interest elastic, and 
the central bank needed the ability to force changes in relevant interest rates. Empirical 
studies, however, found little interest elasticity, and the Treasury restrained the Federal 
Reserve's ability to influence interest rates on government debt. Consequently, the availability 
doctrine developed as an alternative for the efficacy of monetary policy. Proponents of the 
doctrine argue that monetary policy is effective because financial institutions reduce the 
availability of funds rather than through changes in the cost of funds, which was thought to 
be the mechanism of change in the then prevalent view of monetary policy (Scott, 1957). 
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reductions banks made in the availability of their loanable funds. The first 
models of credit rationing use various credit market imperfections to show 
that it is rational for profit-maximizing banks to deny some requests for 
credit rather than to raise interest rates when the demand for loans exceeds 
supply (Freimer and Gordon, 1965; Hodgman, 1960; Jaffee, 1971; and 
Jaffee and Modigliani, 1969; Miller, 1962). Hodgman and Jaffee and 
Modigliani are summarized here because· they were the two most influential 
of the early credit rationing models. 
Hodgman's (1960) model suggests that rational profit-maximizing 
banks use the riskiness of customer loans as the criterion to ration credit.10 
He defines loan risk as the ratio of the expected value of the payoff from a 
loan to the expected value of loss (payments below the agreed upon 
contract). Furthermore, Hodgman assumes that banks require a loan risk 
ratio above the equilibrium ratio that exists in a perfectly competitive market; 
and he demonstrates that as the size of the loan increases, the risk ratio can 
be kept above the equilibrium figure by increasing the interest rate. Beyond 
a certain loan size, however, increasing the interest rate will not prevent a 
decrease in the risk ratio (at this point the supply curve becomes backward 
bending). Thus, the bank will not grant a loan, but will ration credit to a 
prospective borrower who wishes to borrow an amount larger than this 
100ne year later, however, in response to a critique of his 1960 article, Hodgman (1961 a) 
said he now thought bank credit rationing was not caused by risk considerations but by the 
effort of bankers to maximize long-term profits through favored loan treatment of profitable 
depositors-borrowers. 
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maximum, regardless of the interest rate the borrower offers. 
Jaffee and Modigliani (1969) show that the principle of increasing 
default risk with increasing loan size and the narrow spread of loan rates 
over cost (caused by ceiling interest rates) creates a situation where it is 
rational for profit-maximizing banks to ration credit. They base the reason 
for credit rationing on the fact that banks classify borrowers into a small 
number of groups.11 Within each class, the bank charges a uniform rate 
even though the firms within a group may be diverse with respect to risk 
and the amount of their loan demand. The group loan rate is selected to 
maximize bank profits over the entire group. Some firms, however, are 
rationed because they possess above-average demand or above-average risk. 
Consequently, rationing may occur in every risk class. 
Early models of credit rationing show that it is rational for profit-
maximizing banks to ration credit rather than to increase contract interest 
rates when demand exceeds supply.12 In terms of loan pricing, these 
11These groups are based on objective factors such as type of industry, asset size, and 
standard financial measures. Jaffee and Modigliani conclude that bankers can best exploit their 
market power by classifying customers into a small number of classes because of the ceiling 
price caused by considerations of good will, social mores, and legal restrictions. The incentive 
to adopt a segmented classification exists because banks desire to maintain rates as close as 
possible to the collusive optimum, but cannot openly collude. The use of a small number of 
risk classes, based on readily verifiable objective criteria, appears to be an efficient way to 
optimally price loans without competitively underbidding other banks. This classification 
structure is also facilitated by tying rates to a prime rate that is set through price leadership. 
12Empirical tests which support the view of credit rationing on an aggregate banking level 
include Fair and Jaffee (1970), Jaffee (1968), Jaffee and Modigliani (1969), and Silber and 
Polakoff (1970). This research generally focuses on the speed with which commercial loan 
rates adjust to changes in open market rates. A finding of "sticky" rates supports credit 
rationing because it implies that the credit markets do not respond to demand by changing 
(continued ... ) 
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models predict that banks will price loans relative to risk but will choose a 
cut-off contract interest rate that is associated with maximizing their profits. 
However, the early models did not explain the underlying cause of credit 
rationing. 
Credit Rationing Based on Imperfect Information 
The most recent theories of credit rationing use imperfect information 
to explain why rational profit-maximizing banks ration credit.13 This section 
reviews the credit rationing model developed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
and further explained by Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) because it provides 
insight into loan pricing by explaining why the relationship between the 
loan's expected return and contract interest rate is parabolic. In particular, 
their model implies that beyond a certain point, interest rates do not 
compensate sufficiently for risk because"the negative adverse selection and 
incentive effects that accompany relatively high rates may outweigh the 
increase in return from those higher rates as shown in Figure 3.2.14 Thus, 
12( • • •  continued) 
price. Slovin and Sushka (1983), however, find that commercial loan rates are not sticky 
during the period 1953 to 1980. Also, Berger and Udell (1989) provide empirical evidence that 
credit rationing is not an important macroeconomic phenomenon in a test based on over 
1 ,000,000 commercial loans. 
13Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) first suggested that imperfect 
information played a role in loan markets while Jaffee and Russell (1976) were first to apply 
the concept in a model of credit rationing. 
14Similarly, Guttentag and Herring (1984) propose an asymmetric information model, but 
they include the borrower's capital position, default risk, and a probability that nature will draw 
from a disastrous distribution. Their model indicates that lenders maximize expected return 
when the expected value of the increase in the· contract rate when the borrower does not 
default equals the expected loss caused by the induced increase in the probability of default. 
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equilibrium in the credit market may be characterized by credit rationing or 
excess demand. 
To show that credit rationing can exist and that the relationship 
between the bank's expected return and contract interest rate is parabolic, it 
must be shown that the expected 
return a bank receives does not 
increase monotonically with the 
interest rate charged. 
Nonmonotonicity can be shown by 
either adverse selection effects or 
adverse incentive effects. These 
two concepts are explained in turn. 
As noted in the previous 
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Figure 3.2: Relationship Between Expected 
Return and Risk. 
chapter, adverse selection occurs because low-risk borrowers may drop out 
of the market as rates rise and because banks are unable to identify with 
certainty those borrowers who will repay their loan in full. Stiglitz and 
Weiss argue that interest rates may act as a screening device15 in this 
environment because individuals willing to pay relatively high interest rates 
may, on average, be worse risks: they are willing to pay high rates because 
they do not anticipate repaying the loan. 
'6Guttentag and Herring (19841. Milde and Riley (19881. and Schreft and Villamil (19921 
also argue that contract interest rates on loans act as a signalling device of the borrower's 
characteristics when lenders possess imperfect information. 
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An example illustrates how the mix of loan applicants changes 
adversely when interest rates increase. In this example, the bank identifies a 
group of projects and for each project, 9, there exists a distribution of gross 
returns, Rg.16 (Appendix A contains a glossary of symbols.) Moreover, 
assuming that the bank can distinguish projects with different mean returns 
but cannot identify the riskiness of a project, the F(Rg,(J) is the bank's 
subjective perception of the project's distribution of returns and f(Rg,(J) is the 
associated density function. This example also assumes that increases in (J 
correspond to greater risk. Finally, L is the amount a firm borrows at 
contract interest rate i", and the firm defaults if the return plus collateral, K, 
is insufficient to repay its loan: K + Rg � L(1 + i"). 
The net return to the borrower is rr(Rg,i") = max(Rg-(1 +i")L; -K), and it 
indicates that at worst the project fails and the firm must pay the bank the 
agreed upon collateral. 
Moreover, borrowers with riskier 
Net Ret I¥ n to Borrower 
returns possess a higher 
expected profit. Thus, firm 
profits are a convex function of (1-+l�t)L-t:::: 
the return on the project (See 
Figure 3.3). 
-<'-------' 
Figure 3.3: Net Return to Borrower 
16Stiglitz and Weiss assume that both borrowers and lenders seek to maximize profits. 
Also, banks exist within a competitive environment, but a "price-taking" equilibrium does not 
exist such that supply equals demand. 
The return to the bank is 
written as p(Rg,i') = min(Rg + K; 
L(1 +i")) which indicates that the 
bank will collect either the 
maximum that the borrower can 
repay if the project fails or the 
agreed upon interest and 
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Figure 3.4: Return on Loans to Banks 
principal if the project is successful. As shown in Figure 3.4, the return to 
the bank is a concave function of the return on the project. Thus, expected 
return decreases as risk increases because the probability of default 
increases. 
Given the convex nature of the return of the project to firm profits, a 
critical value (risk) iJ exists for a given interest rate i" such that a firm will 
borrow if and only if 0 > IJ. As interest rates rise, the critical value of iJ 
increases, which means that investors with less risky projects are unable to 
make a profit. Thus, they drop out of the market and the mix of applicants 
worsens. At the same time, the concavity of the bank's return indicates 
that the expected returns to the bank are smaller with higher loans. 
Therefore, although an increase in the interest rate increases the bank's 
return, an adverse-selection effect may be acting in the opposite direction. 
Another example clarifies the possibility that the adverse effect 
outweighs the direct effect of an increase in interest rates. Assume only 
two groups of borrowers exist: 
a safe group that borrows only 
when the interest rate is below i-
1 and a risky group that borrows 
only when the interest rate is 
below i-2 where i-1 < i-2. 
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When interest rates are slightly 
above i-1, the mix of applicants 
Figure 3.5: Mix of Applicants Worsens with High 
Rates 
changes dramatically as shown in Figure 3.5 because all of the low-risk 
applicants withdraw. 
The second way changes in interest rates might adversely affect bank 
profits is through their impact on the borrower's behavior or moral hazard. 
Raising the interest rate associated with a project obviously decreases the 
returns on that project to the investor. However, higher interest rates may 
also induce firms to take on projects with lower probabilities of success but 
higher payoffs when successful. 
To show that interest rates act as an incentive mechanism, it is 
assumed that firms may choose alternative projects. The two projects 
considered here are denoted by superscripts "j" and "k." First, Stiglitz and 
Weiss establish that if, at a given contract interest rate i'', a risk-neutral firm 
is indifferent between two projects, an increase in the interest rate causes 
the firm to prefer the project with the higher probability of bankruptcy. The 
increase in i" lowers the 
expected return to the borrower 
from the relatively safe project 
more than it lowers the expected 
return from the project that 
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shown in Figure 3.6 where the Figure 3.6: Rates as an Incentive Mechanism 
borrower chooses risky project j when i" increases beyond i"". As a result, 
raising the interest rate above i"" might increase the riskiness of loans 
enough to lower the expected return to the bank. 
In summary, credit rationing predicts that loans will be priced such 
that the expected return on the loan reaches a maximum at a particular rate 
and beyond that rate declines relative to the contract interest rate. 
Consequently, i" serves as a signal of loan quality. 
Collateral and Credit Rationing 
Collateral requirements provide another mechanism for banks to price 
loans. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) propose that increasing collateral 
requirements or the fraction of the project financed by equity is not a good 
means of allocating credit when an excess demand for funds exists and 
when the contract interest rate is fixed. Under these circumstances, 
increasing collateral requirements beyond some point may also decrease the 
bank's returns by either decreasing the average degree of risk aversion of 
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the pool of borrowers or encouraging borrowers to undertake riskier 
projects.17 
In contrast, some argue that credit rationing is avoided when a bank 
can set collateral requirements and interest rates simultaneously .18 Sarro 
( 1976), for example, argues that collateral functions as an incentive for 
borrowers to repay their loans; and in the case of default, provides some 
return to the bank. As such, he argues that the unwillingness of banks to 
lend in the Jaffee and Modigliani-type theories do not reflect credit rationing 
but reflects (p. 448) " ... the upward slope of the loan supply curve graphed 
versus the appropriate price that includes a consideration of collateral." 
Jaffee and Stiglitz ( 1990), however, argue that the collection of collateral 
may reduce but generally does not eliminate the risk of default because 
collateral may be uncertain and transactions costs may be associated with 
its liquidation. 
17This conclusion is contrary to that of Leland and Pyle (1977) who argue that an investor's 
proportion of equity in a project provides a positive signal of its expected success. However, 
in a study written after the one noted above, Stiglitz and Weiss (1986) show that collateral 
decreases risk when collateral and interest rates are set simultaneously. 
18Similarly, Guttentag and Herring (1984) show that an increase in a borrower's capital 
(asset value) position limits the possibility of moral hazard. This occurs because the optimal 
riskiness of an investment project to a borrower increases as the contract rate rises; but the 
optimal degree of riskiness declines as a borrower's capital position increases. In fact, they 
show that moral hazard disappears when the capital position of the borrower equals the total 
payment from the borrower at the end of the contract period because the borrower cannot 
increase his or her expected return by taking on riskier projects. With no capital position, 
however, the borrower can obtain the maximum benefit from increasing the riskiness of the 




Theories of credit rationing indicate that rational profit-maximizing 
banks may decline some loans rather than let price act as the rationing 
device. In addition, recent theories conflict on whether increasing collateral 
exacerbates or mitigates moral hazard. The implication of these theories for 
loan pricing is that contract loan rates act as a signal of loan quality; and 
because of adverse selection and incentive effects, the relationship between 
a loan's expected return and contract interest rate is curvilinear. 
Loan Pricing and Customer Relationships 
Customer relationship theories propose that customers who contribute 
more to the bank's long-term profitability are given loans with lower rates. 
These theories, however, disagree on the effect that the length of the 
relationship plays in pricing. 
Importance of Customers in Providing Deposits 
The earliest theories of customer relationships developed in response 
to credit rationing by default risk and centered on the importance of 
customers in providing deposits. These theories argue that during times of 
expanding credit demand, customers who are not preferred might be denied 
loans so that funds will be available for the preferred customers who desire 
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more credit. 19 
Hodgman (1961) was first to emphasize the importance of the 
customer relationship. He argued that deposits are important to banks 
because they are a principal and profitable source of the bank's ability to 
lend and invest. The size of a bank's portfolio of earning assets relative to 
equity capital is a function of the amount of its deposits, and the deposits 
are a function of the services provided to deposit customers, including loan 
accommodations. 2° Consequently, when deposit customers provide the 
bank with net income in excess of the activity costs of their account, they 
are granted loans with lower rates than other customers, particularly 
nondepositors. In addition, deposits are particularly dear to banks during 
times of strong loan demand. 
Kane and Malkiel (1965) also argue that deposits play a role in the 
importance of a customer relationship. They show that increases in the 
volatility of individual or aggregate deposit balances unambiguously worsens 
a bank's portfolio because it, ceteris paribus, increases aggregate risk 
19After completing a survey of bankers, Hodgman (1963) concluded that in contrast to 
credit rationing by default risk (p. 149): "In the bank-customer relationship, however, we have 
another explanation for credit rationing which does not depend upon risk or uncertainty and 
which can be related directly to observed bank practice. At the heart of the customer 
relationship is the mutual dependence on loans and deposits. • 
20Hence, bankers will maximize their lending capacity by giving priority to the loan requests 
of their largest depositors. 
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exposure and thus reduces both short- and long-run profits.21 In addition, 
deposit variability decreases expected pr.ofits if the costs of asset acquisition 
and sale are considered or if it is assumed that deposit flows and asset 
yields are inversely related. As a result, a class of customers, c·, exist 
whose past behavior contributes an important and favorable role in 
determining the bank's expected profits and aggregate risk exposure. Thus, 
loan denials to c· requests may cause customer alienation and loss of 
important deposit relationships. 
These deposit-relationship theories were developed within a regulatory 
environment that was more restrictive than that which exists today and a 
less developed market for corporate bond issues. Despite the substantial 
changes in the banking environment over the last decade, deposits remain 
an important low-cost source of funds for banks. Hence, loan pricing 
practices could still be expected to reflect the importance of deposits. 
Other Important Borrower Characteristics 
Kane and Malkiel (1965) argue that, in addition to deposits, the c· 
customers are described by a vector whose elements are indices of the 
account's current size, future growth prospects, length of its attachment to 
the bank, the apparent cohesion of that attachment, and the cyclical pattern 
21Harrison and Meyer (1975) found that increases in deposit variability reduces bank profits 
because it forces banks to increase their holdings of liquid assets tat the cost of being more 
fully loaned. 
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of the customer's loan needs. 22 Obviously, large accounts are preferred to 
small ones, growing accounts are more valuable than declining ones, stable 
deposits are preferred to volatile deposits, old accounts are preferred to new 
accounts,23 and cohesive accounts are preferred to footloose ones.24 The 
characteristics noted here affect both the short-run and long-run bank 
profits. Consequently, one would expect banks to charge lower contract 
loan rates to customers with favorable characteristics. In the short run, c· 
customers would be associated with a smaller return on loans than non-C' 
borrowers. In addition to the above advantages, the marginal cost to 
investigate the new loan requests of c· borrowers are much lower than that 
for new customers. 
Given the importance of c· customers, the relevant marginal 
calculation of granting a loan is not whether the additional profit from 
making the loan outweighs the increased risk. Rather, a utility maximizing 
bank may agree to grant a c· request even though, compared with its 
prerequisite optimum, it is associated with a decrease in utility because not 
granting the loan also decreases utility. This implies that bankers must 
22Some C" borrowers are important to lenders because their borrowing needs are greatest 
at times other than peak credit demands. Kane and Malkiel suggest two ways to measure this 
characteristic: the customer's expected mean indebtedness over typical cycles of loan demand 
and the coefficient of correlation between the customer's outstanding loans and aggregate 
excess demand for loans at the bank. 
23As a banker's experience with an account increases, he or she should be better able to 
predict its behavior. 
24The durability of the past customer-bank relationship should reduce the bank's estimate 
of outcomes around the mean. In other words, its variance. 
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consider the benefit and costs of an entire customer relationship in order to 
price loans. 25 
Customer Relationships with Asymmetric Information 
Both the theory of Hodgman and Kane and Malkiel assume that 
bankers possess full and certain information needed about borrowers. In 
contrast, Sharpe ( 1990), assumes an asymmetric environment. 26 His 
dynamic theory of customer-relationships suggests that long-term bank-
borrower relationships arise endogenously because of the asymmetric 
evolution of information, and these relationships create the potential for ex 
post or temporary monopoly power even though banks are ex ante 
competitive. 27 
According to Sharpe's theory, high quality firms continue to transact 
business with a particular bank, not because they are treated particularly 
well, but because they are "informationally captured." This situation occurs 
because in the process of lending, a bank learns more than others about_ its 
customers. Thus, the bank that loans to the high quality firm offers it a 
26From the bank's view, the discounted income stream associated with the services to 
depositors equals a lump-sum benefit that is tied to customer loans. This benefit may 
outweigh the benefits of the higher contract interest rates obtained from nondepositor loans. 
261n this theory, the key informational asymmetry that affects pricing is that which occurs 
between banks rather than between banks and borrowers. According to Sharpe (1990, p. 431: 
"Rather than moral hazard, it is the potential for taking advantage of captive customers, by 
altering the terms of trade, that gives rise to a reputation equilibrium where competitors earn 
rents over time." 
27 Jaffee and Stiglitz ( 19901 also argue that the information costs of determining default 
create a tendency toward natural monopoly in the supply of credit to a particular person, firm, 
or industry. 
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lower rate, when compared with other banks (although the lower rate still 
allows the bank to accrue rents). Competing banks do not offer lower rates 
than the bank which currently serves the customer because it is difficult for 
the borrowing firm to convey information to other banks about its superior 
performance.28 Moreover, adverse selection makes it difficult for a bank to 
attract another bank's good customers without drawing the bad customers 
as well. 
Although banks are expected to earn no profit over the life of an 
average customer relationship, an inefficient allocation of capital occurs 
because the market does not force banks to offer better rates to their higher 
quality customers than to their lower quality customers. Consequently, 
banks can expect to earn economic profits on their better customers. These 
rents are competed away, however, because competition forces banks to 
grant lower interest rates on loans offered to new customers (when banks 
possess the least information about the firms). As a result, lower quality 
firms acquire a larger proportion of the bank's capital than in the standard 
asymmetric information case. 29 
28Sharpe's theory presents important information about the far-reaching economic impact 
of bank failures which is consistent with Bernanke's (1 983) explanation that the rise in the 
cost of credit from the collapse of financial institutions may have contributed to the depth of 
the Great Depression. Specifically, Sharpe implies that when a bank fails, its best customers 
are unlikely to find another bank that will lend to it as cheaply. In this case, it is possible that 
the additional interest burden placed on the firm will cause it to lower working capital 
investment which ultimately may lead to less production, employment, and even bankruptcy. 
29Sharpe's theory suggests that the inefficiencies just noted can be reduced if banks 
develop reputations based on nonbinding promises. As future market participants learn that 
(continued ... ) 
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Empirical Test of Customer Relationships 
The few empirical tests of customer relationships that were identified 
provide support that these relationships play a role in pricing. Using a 
sample of 3 large banks, Hester ( 1979) found that deposit balances and the 
number of years the depositor had been with the bank favorably affected the 
terms of the customer's loan. Also, Murphy (1969) found indirect support 
that depositors receive some reduction in the price of loans vis-a-vis 
nondeposits. In a more extensive study of 674 loans collected in 1972 from 
62 banks, Hester ( 1979) found, ceteris paribus, borrowers with larger 
demand deposit balances are charged lower contract interest rates on loans. 
Also, previous borrowers from the bank received lower interest rates than 
first-time borrowers. In general, he concludes that (p. 355) 
... a bank determines loan amount in large part by evaluating the 
nature of its relationship with a borrower. Once the decision to 
lend and the loan amount are settled, a bank apparently looks 
to collateral for protection and to a differential in the interest 
rate to compensate itself for risk exposure. 
Hester's results also provide some support for Sharpe's theory. In 
particular, he found that borrowers who are considered "highly profitable 
customers to the bank in the past" are charged new loan rates that are 
relatively high when compared with all other customers. 
29( ... continued) 
the bank keeps its promises, wimplicit contractsw arise. These commitments are characterized 
by prices that more closely approximate the optimal prices, and therefore lead to a more 
efficient allocation of capital. 
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Summary 
The customer-relationship approach to pricing suggests that, in view 
of a bank's total portfolio and long-term profits, some customer relationships 
provide a greater net contribution to profits than others. Therefore, these 
preferred customers are charged lower contract interest rates on loans than 
other customers. Moreover, a bank might ration credit to other applicants 
during times of rising credit demand in order to ensure available credit for its 
preferred customers. 
In an environment of asymmetric information, however, Sharpe 
suggests that a bank's long-term customers become informationally 
captured such that they cannot obtain a lower contract interest rate at 
another bank. In this model, the asymmetric evolution of information 
creates ex post monopoly powers for the bank; but the market for new 
customers remains competitive. Thus, long-standing customers are charged 
relatively higher contract interest rates compared with new customers. 
Moreover, to the degree that banks lend to new customers at interest rates 
that are initially low, these accounts are likely to generate losses. 
Summary Comments and General Hypotheses 
As reviewed in this chapter, portfolio theory as well as the theories of 
customer relationships and credit rationing provide information about loan 
pricing. Although these theories overlap to some degree, each suggests 
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unique predictors of the expected return on commercial loans which are 
determined by pricing procedures (See Table 3.1 ). Mean-variance analysis 
and portfolio theory indicate that risk is the most important predictor of 
expected return. In contrast, credit rationing theories suggest that the loan 
contract rate is the most important determinant of expected return, and the 
relationship between these two variables is curvilinear. Although recent 
theories agree that the relationship is caused by adverse selection and 
incentive effects, they conflict on whether increased collateral requirements 
reduces the negative adverse affects. 
Finally, customer relationship theories suggest that a number of 
customer characteristics affect loan pricing, but these theories propose 
conflicting explanations of the length of customer attachment to the bank. 
Some customer relationship theories indicate that better customers, 
including those who have borrowed from the bank for a long period of time, 
are more highly valued customers and thus are charged lower rates. In 
contrast, Sharpe's theory of customer relationships posits that banks charge 
relatively high rates to customers who have dealt with the bank for a longer 
period and charge relatively low rates to new customers. 
The general research question to be tested in this study is how banks 
price commercial loans. The theories reviewed in this chapter imply several 
hypotheses that provide information about the research question. 
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Portfolio Theory: 
Hypothesis 1 a: Banks price commercial loans such that the expected return 
is positively related to the loan's individual risk and the loan's contribution of 
risk to the bank's entire loan portfolio. 
Credit Rationing 
Hypothesis 2a: Banks price commercial loans such that the expected return 
reaches a maximum at a particular rate and beyond that point declines 
relative to the contract interest rate. 
Hypothesis 2b: The expected return on collateralized loans is greater than 
the expected return on noncollateralized loans. 
Customer Relationship: 
Hypothesis 3a: Banks price commercial loans such that the expected return 
they earn from commercial loan customers who contribute most to the long­
term profitability is lower in the short run than that which they receive from 
non preferred customers. 
Hypothesis 3b: The expected return banks earn from commercial loan 
customers who have been with the bank for a long period of time is greater 
than that for new customers. 
50 
















Hodgman (1961) Figure 3.9 
Kane and Malkiel 
(1965) 
















•Contribution to Portfolio Risk 
•Interest Rates as Signal 
•Collateral as Signal 
•Collateral Solves Moral Hazard 
•Importance of Customer Relationships 




Figure 3.7: Mean-Variance Analysis Figure 3.8: Credit Rationing 
r(R) 
D..tcr....- 0-.ract..-latlc:s Yeerg wlt.h Bark: 
Figure 3.9: Customer Relationships with Figure 3.10: Customer Relationships with 




This chapter explains the methodology that will be used to test the 
general research question of whether mean-variance portfolio theory, credit 
rationing, and/or customer relationship theories explain the way banks price 
commercial loans. First, limitations of the analysis are considered. Second, 
the data, which consist of the commercial loan portfolio of a medium-sized 
bank, are described. Third, the variables used in this study are defined, and 
the ordinary least square equations that specify each of the theories is 
presented. Finally, the non-nested tests are described. These tests are used 
to determine if any of the three models provides an explanation for the way 
loans are priced. 
Limitations of Analysis 
Three main limitations should be kept in mind when reviewing this 
analysis. First, because this analysis is based on the loan portfolio of one 
bank, the implications of the regressions performed here will provide 
evidence with regard to commercial loan pricing practices. However, the 
results should be cautiously applied to other banks because a bank's degree 
of risk aversion affects its pricing practices. 
52 
53 
A second limitation concerns the calculation of the expected return, 
which is the dependent variable. The expected return was derived by 
making assumptions about default rates and the recovery associated with 
defaulted loans. At first, this appears to be a significant hindrance to the 
tests. Hdwever, whenever an investor considers purchasing an asset, he or 
she must derive the expected return based on the best information available. 
This is a particularly formidable task with bank loans because information is 
less available when compared with the bond or stock markets. A more 
detailed explanation of the derivation of expected return follows in this 
chapter. 
Finally, it is assumed that the proper model specification is used to 
test each theory. The relationship between risk and return has been well 
developed and accepted in portfolio theory, but the theories of credit 
rationing and customer relationships are not as standardized. Consequently, 
some may argue that the specifications used in this paper do not fully 
capture the theories they are said to represent. 
Data 
The loan-related data used in this study were obtained from databases 
maintained by one of the top 50 bank holding companies in the nation. 
Consequently, the detail of the data surpasses that of databases previously 
used that rely on the Federal Reserve Bank's Survey of Terms of Bank 
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Lending. The database used in this study contains commercial loan 
information at the customer and the loan (note} level. In addition, it contains 
information about other services used by the customer such as certificates 
of deposit. 
Description of the Data 
The cross-sectional database created for this study consists of 1,670 
loans granted by the case study bank from July 1992 through December 
1992.1 Because this study attempts to determine how loans are priced, the 
database identifies the relevant variables at the loan origination date. In 
other words, if the loan is granted in July 1992, the relevant variables are 
those that existed in July 1992 which the loan officers could have used to 
determine the proper price of the loan. The loan-specific information 
includes items such as the risk rating, expected maturity, contract interest 
rate, and deposits. Table 4.1 describes the variables used in this study and 
provides descriptive statistics. All variables were obtained from the case 
study bank except for CORR and GROWTH which were created by using 
data from ZETA® Services and the U.S. Department of Labor. The 
'The time frame during which loan information was obtained from the case study bank is 
limited because customer-related information was not available in the database prior to July 
1992. In addition, some of the loans in the database were excluded from the study because 
of the bias they would introduce into the tests. Specifically, a large number of loans were 
excluded because they were floor plans for automobile dealers. Floor plan loans consist of a 
separate loan for each automobile the dealer possesses. Consequently, these multiple loans 
were associated with identical customer-specific data, which could bias the regression results. 
Also, some loans were excluded because they were associated with organizations that are 
granted lower rates because of their tax-exempt status. The loans of these firms are faced 
with a different pricing scheme than other firms and would also bias the results of the empirical 
tests performed for this study. Finally, the database includes fixed and variable rate loans. 
Table 4.1: Description of the Database 
Obser- Standard 
Variable Description vations Mean Deviation Minim!,!m Maximum 
E(R1) Bank's expected return on loan i (equation 4.1) 1,670 1.38 2.39 -13.85 14.43 
i � Contract interest rate on loan i 1,670 7.05 1.57 3.12 18.00 
ii Average monthly cost of funds by maturity' 1,670 4.01 0.82 2.92 7.28 
d; Probability of default associated with loan i 1,670 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.40 
IRR1 Internal rate of return if loan i defaults 1,670 -38.51 29.26 -94.50 7.00 
VAR1 Variance on loan i (equation 3.2) 1,670 69.74 90.05 0.00 936.72 
RISK1 Bank determined customer risk code for loan i 1,670 3.70 0.80 1.00 6.00 
PREMIUM1 Contract rate less cost of funds (i' -i) for loan i 1,670 3.03 1.40 -1.99 14.55 
MATURITY1 Estimated days to maturity for loan i 1,670 734.00 603.00 1.00 2,730.00 
A; Original amount of loan i (in thousands) 1,670 1,036.00 3,434.00 1.00 45,000.00 
GROWTH1 1 0-year projected growth rate for 3-digit SIC to 
which loan i belongs 1,670 21.07 23.03 -45.95 107.10 
CORR1 Correlation between loan industry and bank loan portfolio 1,670 0.02 0.15 -0.49 0.59 
DEPOSITS1 Amount of deposits associated with loan applicant i 1,670 11,045.00 40,939.00 0.00 551,576.00 
DEPSTE1 Standard error of deposits associated with loan i .. 899 20,518.00 54,040.00 6.84 551,576.00 
TIME1 Length of the customer i' s relationship with the bank 1,670 2,451.00 2,701.00 3.00 16,621.00 
'Using an average rather than daily cost of funds introduces a small measuring error into the E(R1). However, the monthly change in the 
cost of funds was relatively small. The average one-month change in the cost of funds over the three-year period used was 15 basis 
points for the overnight rate and successively smaller average changes for the long-term rates . 
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.. DEPSTE covers a period of six months: July 1992 through January 1992. The standard error statistic is used rather than the standard 
deviation to reduce volatility caused by an upward trend in deposits (See Murphy, 1968 and 1969 for problems related to measuring 
variation in deposits). 
derivation of GROWTH and CORR will be explained in greater detail later. 
Measuring Expected Return 
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The expected return of an asset is measured at the time the loan is 
originated and is the sum of the return of its probable outcomes multiplied 
by the probability of their occurrences (Markowitz, 1958). 2 Measuring the 
expected return on bank loans is difficult because the market for bank loans 
is limited. Therefore, no quoted market prices exist like those of stocks and 
bonds. Interpreting Financial Accounting Standard Number 1 07's 
recommendations for fair valuation of securities that have no quoted market 
prices, Kao (1992) suggests adjusting cash flow by a loan's future default 
probability and the salvage value in the event of default. Expanding on 
Kao's suggestion, the expected return in this study is calculated with the 
following four variables: 1) the probability of default, 2) the cost of funds, 
3) the return on the loan if it is paid-in-full, and 4) the return on the loan if it 
defaults. In equation form, 
(4.1) E(R;) = [( 1 -d;) O ; -i;l + d(IRR;-i;)] 
where E(R;) is the bank's expected return on loan i, d; is the default 
probability on loan i, i ; is the contract interest rate on loan i, i; is the cost of 
funds given loan i's maturity and origination date, and IRR; is the internal 
rate of return on loan i if it defaults. An explanation of the measurement of 
the variables follows. 
2See pages 23-25 for a more in-depth explanation of expected return. 
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Default Rate. The first consideration in determining the expected 
return of the loan is the default rate. Although default rates for commercial 
loans are not available, they exist for corporate bonds which are found in an 
environment similar to that of commercial loans. In fact, Altman (1992 and 
1993) and Kao ( 1992) suggest that bond mortality rates can be used to 
determine lenders' expected loss rates and this method is used by Miller 
( 1991 a) at an aggregate level. 3 The bond default rates, 4 shown in Table 
4.2, were determined by Standard & Poor's (January 1993 CreditReview) 
based on a pool of new corporate bonds issued in the 1980s and are used in 
this study as estimated defaults for commercial loans. A bond rated 888 or 
a loan rated 2, 5 for example, is associated with 1.24 percent probability of 
defaulting within the first four years and 8.64 percent within ten years. 
Both the bank's risk rating and the estimated maturity of the loan were used 
to determine the probability of default for each loan in the database.6 
3The author knows of no study that tests the appropriateness of using bond default rates 
as a substitute of default for commercial loans. Until commercial loan default data are 
collected, however, bond default rates remain one of the few alternatives to approximate 
commercial loan default. 
41n the Standard & Poor's study, a bond is said to default if the firm fails to make an 
interest or principal payment by the due date or if the firm files for bankruptcy. 
6The bank risk ratings used by the case study bank are integers one through eight where 
one is associated with the least probability of default. Banks generally do not grant loans if 
the risk rating is higher than "four." Particularly during recessionary periods, however, a bank 
may grant a loan to a current customer whose credit rating has fallen to six or seven in order 
to help maintain the viability of the firm. 
6Risk ratings were matched with the Standard & Poor's corporate bond ratings through 
discussion with individuals at the case study bank involved in loan pricing. 
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Cost of Funds. The second variable needed to measure expected return 
is the cost of funds. This variable was obtained from the case study bank 
and is the average monthly cost of funds.8 The cost of funds is based on 
the yield of government securities of a like maturity with the loan plus an 
additional amount that covers insurance and broker costs. 
Return on the Loan if Paid-In-Full. The third variable, the return on a 
paid-in-full loan, is easily measured. It is the contract interest rate less the 
cost of funds. Thus, if the contract interest rate on the loan is 5 percent 
and the cost of funds is 2 percent, then the return on the loan is 3 percent. 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR). The final variable to consider is the IRR 
that results if the loan defaults. Measuring the default on loans is difficult 
because banks have not built statistically credible databases pertaining to 
7The default rates associated with this risk rating is an average of the B and BB ratings. 
8The case study bank uses daily data in assessing the cost of funds, but only monthly 
historical data were available. Using an average rather than a daily cost of funds introduces 
a small measuring error into the expected return. However, the monthly change in the cost 
of funds was relatively small. The average one-month change in the cost of funds over the 
study period used was 1 5 basis points for the overnight rate and successively smaller average 
changes for the long-term rates. 
59 
the defaults and recoveries of loans.9 Therefore, the default measurements 
used in this study are based on the limited analysis that has been performed 
by trade groups, consultants, and employees of the case study bank. 
An example calculation of IRR is shown at the end of this section. First, 
however, the following four variables used to derive IRR are explained: 1) 
the amount of the loan that is paid off before default, 2) the percentage of 
the original loan amount that is recovered from the collateral, 3) the contract 
interest rate, and 4) the expected maturity of the loan. 
The first consideration in measuring the IRR is the a1119unt of the loan 
that is repaid before the loan defaulted. The measure used in this study is 
based on an examination of highly leveraged loans by Loan Pricing 
Corporation. In that study, Miller (1991 a) found that, on average, default 
occurred after 34 percent of the initial commitment was paid. 10 Similarly, 
this study assumes that if the loan defaults, the default occurs after 34 
percent of the initial commitment is paid. Thus, a $10,000 loan defaults the 
month that total interest plus principal payments equals $3.400. 
The second factor used in measuring IRR is based on the type of 
collateral associated with the loan. The case study database identifies the 
type of collateral, such as undeveloped land, inventories, and equipment 
associated with each loan. Estimates for the expected percentage of loan 
9For a description of this problem, see Loomis ( 1 993). 
10The time period over which this study was performed was not cited. 
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loss in the case of default were obtained by collateral types through 
discussions with executives at the case study bank and consultants in the 
field of banking. These discussions produced loss estimates on more than 
50 collateral categories that varied widely from 0 percent if the loan was 
secured by certificates of deposit to more than 50 percent for some types of 
unsecured real estate.11 The loss amount is based on principal only and 
does not consider losses due to lost interest payments or other costs 
associated with recovery. 
The last two factors used to measure IRR, the contract interest rate and 
the expected maturity of the loan, are found in the case study bank's 
database. 
The calculation of IRR can now be shown in an example. Assume a 
$10,000 loan is granted with a contract interest rate of 8 percent and a 
maturity of 4 years.12 In addition, the loan is collateralized with a type of 
collateral that is associated with a 50 percent total recovery rate. Further, it 
is assumed that 34 percent of the original loan amount was paid before the 
date of default. Such a loan requires monthly payments of $244.13 and 
would default at its 14th loan payment--the time at which approximately 34 
percent or $3,400 of the original loan amount was paid. Because of the 
type of collateral associated with this loan, an additional $1,582 is 
1 'The exact loss amounts are not shown here for confidentiality reasons. 
121n calculating the IRR, the loan maturity and interest rate was rounded to the nearest 
whole number. 
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recovered for a total recovery of $5,000 or 50 percent. The IRR, which is 
-54.30 percent, is calculated by solving the following equation: 
O=E $244.13 + $1,600 - 10,000 
,., (1 + IRR)t112 (1 + IRR)7712 
where t represents the number of months from the origination date of the 
loan and increases toT which is the month of default. In the example 
shown above, T equals 14. 
An Example of Expected Return. By way of example, Table 4.3 shows 
the computation of expected return for four loans found in the database. 
Table 4.3: Measuring Expected Return with Information Available at the Time of the loan 
Origination 
Cost Payoff Loss 
Risk Maturity Default Contract of Before Based on 
Loan Rating Years Probability Rate Funds Default Collateral 
A 1 1.0 0.0000 6.00 3.89 0.34 -0.38 
B 2 4.0 0.0124 6.25 3.89 0.34 0.00 
c 3 3.0 0.0499 6.50 3.61 0.34 0.00 
D 4 3.0 0.0650 7.00 3.61 0.34 -0.25 
Loan E(Rl 
A 0.021100 = [(1-0.0000)(0.0600) + (0.0000)(-0.7840)]- 0.0389 
B 0.022825 = [(1-0.0124)(0.0625) + (0.0124)(-0.001 0)] - 0.0389 
c 0.025654 = [(1-0.0499)(0.0650) + (0.0499)(-0.0050)]- 0.0361 







Loan pricing procedures are examined by performing a series of cross 
sectional ordinary and generalized least square regressions where the 
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expected return on the loan is the dependent variable in each of the 
regressions (see Table 4.4) .13 Since one cannot nest these specifications, 
non-nested hypothesis testing criteria are used to discriminate among the 
specifications shown in Table 4.4 




Controlling for Maturity and Size 
A consideration before moving on to the measurement of each 
hypothesis is how to control for maturity and size.14 The maturity of a loan 
13Some might argue that the contract interest rate (price) should be used as the dependent 
variable, but credit rationing theories preclude this use because they suggest that the contract 
interest rate signals loan quality which determines price. In other words, the contract loan rate 
is an independent rather than dependent variable. Using expected return as the dependent 
variable affords a test of the hypothesized credit rationing relationship between the expected 
return and the contract interest rate. The tradeoff is that the tests now measure the expected 
return, which is determined by price (contract interest rate), rather than testing price directly. 
14The results of the hypothesis may also vary by loan purpose because the type or purpose 
of the loan also affects its riskiness. Inventory loans, for example, may be less risky than loans 
for the expansion of plant and equipment because the payoff from plant and equipment is 
based on a larger and more sustained increase in demand than that typically needed to exhaust 
inventories. Such information, however, was not available from the case study bank. 
63 
affects its riskiness because the longer the maturity, the greater the 
possibility that default might occur. Although maturity is incorporated by 
differences in the cost of funds and default probabilities, it is included as an 
independent variable in each equation specified to capture any residual 
effects of the length of the loan on the expected return. 
Different pricing practices are expected by size because larger loans 
are generally associated with larger firms 1 l that often possess publicly 
traded stocks which translates into more public information about the firms 
and 2) that experience a more competitive loan environment because of the 
national rather than regional scope of their market. Therefore, the original 
amount of the loan is added to each regression. 
Testing Mean-Variance Portfolio Theory 
Mean-variance portfolio theory is considered in hypothesis 1 below. 
Hypothesis 1 : Banks price commercial loans such that the 
expected return is linearly15 and positively related to the loan's 
individual risk and the loan's contribution of risk to the bank's 
entire loan portfolio. 
The following equation considers whether mean-variance analysis and 
portfolio theory are used in pricing: 
Equation (4.2) is a cross-sectional test in which E(R;l represents the 
bank's expected return from loan i, p, is the constant term, VAR; is the 
16Linearity is assumed as a first approximation. 
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variance 16 for loan i, VARf is the variance squared and is used to test 
whether the relationship is nonlinear, CORR; measures the correlation of an 
industry's credit quality with the return on the bank's total loan portfolio, M; 
is the number of days over which the loan is to be paid, A; is the original 
amount of the loan, and E; is the error term. 
The variable which represents the correlation between the return on the 
case study bank's loan portfolio and the loan industry's credit quality 
(CORR) warrants further explanation. The return on the bank's loan portfolio 
is simply the interest income produced from the loan portfolio less charge-
offs net of recoveries all divided by the total loan balance.17 Credit quality 
is the percentage change in the credit quality of the 4-digit standard 
industrial classification (SIC) to which the loan belongs.18 The credit 
quality measure was obtained from ZETA® Services which specializes in 
measuring credit quality. Both the return on the bank portfolio and credit 
quality measures are quarterly and were correlated for the 39 quarters from 
the second quarter of 1983 through the fourth quarter of 1991. 
18Even though the variance is measured from the expected return, which is the dependent 
variable, the relationship predicted by mean-variance analysis is not a certainty because the 
bank can misprice the loan by applying the wrong premium (contract interest rate less cost of 
funds), risk rating, or collateral reQuirements. In fact, loan D in Table 4.3 is mispriced relative 
to its variance. The variance of each loan in the table is: VARA = 0.00000, VAR8 = 0.479, 
VARc = 2.006, and VAR0 = 85.465. [Variances in the regressions are multiples by 100 to 
avoid the negative bias that would occur when numbers less than one are sQuared.] 
17These data were obtained from the case study bank's Quarterly earnings reports. 
181n some cases, a 4-digit SIC credit Quality measure was not available. Therefore, CORR 
was measured at the 3-digit SIC level for 102 observations and at the 2-digit SIC level for 1 18 
observations. 
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The correlation between the bank's return on its loan portfolio and 
credit quality provides a useful measure of portfolio pricing because the 
lower correlations of returns between loans leads to lower variations in the 
entire portfolio.19 Thus, if a loan's credit quality moves opposite that of the 
case study bank's loan portfolio over time, the addition of this loan to the 
portfolio could reduce the variability of the entire loan portfolio. Said 
differently, the variation of an existing loan portfolio can be reduced by 
adding loans of firms whose business cycle runs counter to that of the 
bank's portfolio. The underlying concept is that a firm's credit quality is 
most likely to deteriorate during business downturns. If the firm's business 
cycle trough occurs counter to that of the bank's loan portfolio, then adding 
the counter-cyclical firm's loan to the bank's portfolio can potentially reduce 
the variation in the portfolio. 
Because bankers are generally risk-averse (Flannery, 1985 and Hester 
and Pierce, 1972), they are expected to place greater value on industries 
that reduce the total variability of the return on their loan portfolio. 
Moreover, "Because bank shareholders are willing to trade off some 
expected profits in order to avoid uncertainty (and vice versa), the 
diversification principle has an important implication for loan pricing" 
(Flannery, 1985, p. 462). Consequently, it is hypothesized that bankers 
discount the contract interest rate of loans whose industry is associated 
19For a more detailed explanation of the role correlations play in portfolios, see pages 25 
through 27. 
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with a relatively small or negative correlation (higher credit quality numbers 
are associated with better credit quality). Hence, P4 is expected to be 
positive. 
Support for mean-variance analysis would be evident from a positive 
and statistically significant P2 coefficient because the expected return should 
increase as the variance increases. In addition, assuming a linear 
relationship between risk and return, P3 is expected to be statistically 
insignificantly different from zero. A joint hypothesis test (Yancey, Judge, 
and Bock, 1981) would indicate thatP2>0 andP3=0. However, the 
relationship between expected return and risk may not be linear. Therefore, 
portfolio theory would be supported by P3 > 0. As noted above, portfolio 
theory suggests a positive coefficient P4 since loans that decrease the 
variance of the bank's loan portfolio are expected to be priced relatively 
lower than other loans and hence should be associated with a lower 
expected return. Finally, in this test as well as the others noted below, P5, 
the coefficient which measures maturity, is expected to be positive because 
longer maturities are generally associated with higher default rates. 
Testing the Theory of Credit Rationing 
The pricing implications of credit rationing theories are considered in 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: Banks price commercial loans such that the 
expected return reaches a maximum at a particular rate and 
beyond that point declines relative to the contract interest rate. 
Hyoothesis 2b: The expected return on collateralized loans is 
greater than the expected return on noncollateralized loans. 
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The following equation considers the implications from the theory of 
credit rationing in pricing commercial loans: 
where i ; represents the contract interest rate. In this case, the contract 
interest rate on the loan acts as a signal that, after a particular point, causes 
the expected return on the loan to fall (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 ) . Therefore, 
a statistically significant positive /12 and negative {13 would support credit 
rationing because the relationship between the expected return and interest 
rates form a parabola. In this case, a joint hypothesis would indicate that 
{12 > 0 and /13 < 0. If only /13 is statistically significantly different from zero 
and positive, this result would not provide evidence against credit rationing 
because a bank that properly rations credit based on default risk would 
decline loans at the point where adverse selection and moral hazard 
outweighs the possible increased returns from risk. 
A secondary question raised in credit rationing literature is whether 
collateral intensifies moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) or reduces it 
(Guttentag and Herring, 1984). 20 This question is investigated with an 
analysis of the means of the expected return on loans when loans are 
20Moral hazard, which means that borrowers take on more risk than agreed upon in the 
contract, may still occur if the loan is paid in full. In such a case, the borrower who took on 
a riskier project was successful. It is unlikely that this happened enough times to significantly 
bias the results, particularly since the sample data include a business cycle downturn. 
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grouped based on whether the loan terms include collateral. 
Testing Customer-Relationship Theories 
The pricing implications of customer relationships are considered in the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: Banks price commercial loans such that the 
expected return they earn from commercial loan customers who 
contribute most to their long-term profitability is lower in the 
short run than that which they receive from nonpreferred 
customers. 
Hypothesis 3b: The expected return a bank earns from 
commercial loan customers who have been with the bank for a 
long period of time is greater than that for new customers. 
The following equation is used to test the degree to which customer 
relationships are important in pricing loans as defined by Hodgman (1961 
and 1963) and Kane and Malkiel (1965): 
Sharpe (1990), however, suggests an opposing model with regard to time: 
In the above equations, SIZE; is the current size of account i, GROWTH; is 
the future growth prospects for account i, DEPOSITS; is the total deposits 
for account i, and TIME; is the total days customer i has dealt with the bank. 
The measurement of the variables in equations (4.4) and (4.5) is fairly 
straightforward. GROWTH is the projected growth rate of industry 
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employment from 1990 through 2005 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1992). 21 
Projections were generally applied at the three-digit standard industrial 
classification level. 22 DEPOSITS is the dollar value of deposits. TIME is the 
number of days since the customer opened his or her first loan or deposit 
account with the bank. 
Support for the importance of customer relationships in pricing would 
be indicated by a negative coefficient for DEPOSITS and GROWTH. Also, a 
negative coefficient for TIME would provide evidence for the importance of 
customer relationships as suggested by Hodgman and Kane and Malkiel; but 
a positive coefficient would support Sharpe's "informationally captured" 
notion. A further test of Sharpe's concept is provided in equation (4.5) 
where TIME is transformed by using a log function because the relationship 
between the expected return on the loan relative to the length of the 
relationship is expected to be convex: the interest rate on loans for new 
customers are discounted while longer customers are charged a higher rate. 
Non-Nested Tests 
The explanatory power of the models that represent the theories above 
are compared by using the non-nested J-test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 
2'These projections are used because they were available in 1 992 when the loans in the 
database were made. Output is a better measure of industry growth, but it is not available 
from a public source at the level of detail used in this study. 
221f a growth projection is not available at the 3-digit SIC level, then the projection for the 
relevant 2-digit level is used. One hundred twenty observations required projections at the 2-
digit level. 
1981) and Cox test (Cox, 1961 and 1962 and Pesaran, 1974). 23 These 
tests are explained through the following two hypothesis: 
H0: Y = XPx + Ux 
H,: y = xp, + u, 
The J-test is performed by first separately performing the regressions 
specified by theories "X" and "Z" and saving the fitted values (Yx and Yz) 
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from the regressions. The second step involves re-estimating the regression 
concerning theory X and including Yz from the second equation as an 
independent variable. If the coefficient on y, is significantly different from 
zero, then the null hypothesis that model X provides the greatest 
explanatory power is rejected in favor of H,. This process is repeated to test 
whether theory X provides additional information to theory Z by reversing 
the roles of H0 and H,. It is possible that both models will be rejected as the 
most informative set of regressors. 
The Cox-test is a stronger nonnested test because it takes into account 
the residuals as well as the predicted values of the competing theories. The 
explanation of this test is based on the following two regression models 
(Greene, 1993, pp. 222-225): 
Mx: Y = XPx + Ux, 
Mz: Y = Z/3z + Uz, 
Ux - N(O,a-21"), 
Uz - N(O,w210), 
where y is the (n X 1) vector of observations on the dependent variable, X 
and Z are (n X kxl and (n X kz) observation matrices for the regressors of 
23Models are non-nested if the regressors of one model cannot be expressed as a linear 
combination of the regressors of the second model (Pesaran, 1987). 
71 
models Mx and Mz, Px and Pz are the (kx X 1) and (kz X 1) regression 
coefficient vectors, and Ux and Uz are the (n X 1) error vectors, and I" is the 
identity matrix of order n. 
The information needed to calculate the Cox statistic for testing the 
hypothesis that X provides greater explanatory power than Z is obtained as 
by-products of computing the following four least square regressions. (See 
Table 4.5 for a summary of this procedure.) First, the regression model Mx 
is run to obtain the fitted value (Xb) and the mean-squared residual (s�). The 
value for s� is set aside to be used in the Cox statistic. Second, Xb is used 
as the dependent variable with the independent variables of the competing 
model. This regression is performed in order to obtain the residuals (M,Xb) 
and the sum of squared residuals (b'X'MzXb) which are set aside to be used 
in the Cox statistic. Third, the residuals M.Xb are used as the dependent 
variable with the independent variables of the regressors for theory X. The 
value for the sum of squared residuals (b'X'MzlMx(MzXb) from this 
regression is set aside to be used in the Cox statistic. Finally the regression 
model M. is run to obtain its mean-squared residual (s�). 
The above information is used to compute two more statistics that 
allow the measurement of the Cox statistic (q). First s�x is computed as s� 
+ ( 1 /n)b'X'MzXb. Second c12 is computed as 
2 2 
c12 = !!.tn[ 
s, 
1 = !!.tn[2] 
2 s! +(1/n)b1X1M�b 2 s
! 
Now, the hypothesis that X is the correct set of regressors and Z is not is 
tested by the following statistic: 
Table 4.5: Definition of Variables Needed to Compute the Cox-Statistic 
Regression Models: 
Mx: y = XPx + Ux, 
Mz: Y = Z/iz + Uz, 
C12 Cox Statistic = q= ------
(Est. Var(c12])112 
where 
Ux - N(O,ifl"), 
Uz - N(O,w21nl. 
s� = e�ez/n = mean-squared residual in the regression of y on Z 
s� 
= 
e�ex/n = mean-squared residual in the regression of y on X 
Xb = fitted values in the regression of y on X 
MzXb = residuals in a regression of Xb on Z 
b'X'MzXb = sum of squared residuals in the regression of Xb on Z 
six = s� + (1/n)b'X'MzXb 
(b'X'MzlMx(MzXbl = sum of squared residuals in the regression MzXb on X 
Mx = I - X(X'X)'1 X' 
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where a large value of q in a standard normal table is evidence against the 
null hypothesis that X is the correct set of regressors. 
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As noted earlier, the nonnested tests consider the explanatory power of 
one hypothesis against another. Since three hypotheses are considered in 
this study, the tests must be computed for three pairs: 1) portfolio versus 
credit rationing, 2) portfolio versus customer relationships, and 3) credit 
rationing versus customer relationships. Failing to reject one hypothesis 
does not rule out the possibility that the other hypotheses contribute 
information about pricing. 
CHAPTER V 
PRESENTATION OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This chapter contains the empirical results of the tests presented in 
the previous chapter. The results provide evidence consistent with credit 
rationing and customer relationship theories. Both the nonnested J-test and 
the Cox test indicate that the specification used for the credit rationing 
model provides more information about the expected return on loans than 
the specification used for the customer relationship model. 
The specification used to test portfolio theory provides statistically 
significant results, but of the wrong sign: the expected return on loans 
decreases as risk (variance) increases. Further tests were performed 
because of this surprising result, and the additional tests suggest that loan 
pricing at the case study bank might not adequately account for losses 
associated with the possibility of default. In other words, default is more 
likely with high variability of return which suggests that the case study bank 
might be mispricing its loans. 
Finally, the impact of collateral on loan pricing is considered. The 
results indicate that the expected return associated with collateralized loans 
is lower than that for loans without collateral. These results are consistent 
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with Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) who argue that firms use collateral to 
obtain more favorable loan terms. 
Testing for Heteroscedasticity 
Most of the theories tested in this chapter were positively evaluated 
for heteroscedasticity. A priori evidence and examination of the residual 
patterns of the dependent variables suggest the original amount of the loan 
(A) is causing the heteroscedasticity problem.1 As shown in Table 5.1, the 
Park-Giejser test statistically verifies that the original amount of the loan is 
contributing to the heteroscedasticity. 2 
Even though the data are heteroskedastic, they are not adjusted to 
reduce the heteroskedasticity because the nonnested tests used in this 
chapter require ordinary least squares regression results. Moreover, even in 
the presence of heteroskedasticity, the parameter estimates remain unbiased 
and consistent. 3 As a result, the coefficients can be interpreted 
1A priori, the variance of the loan amount is expected to increase around the expected 
return as loans became smaller because smaller loans are associated with less information and 
thus are probably priced with greater variation. In contrast, larger loans typically originate from 
larger firms, which often are traded publicly. The larger loans are probably priced more 
accurately because of the additional information. 
2The Park-Giejser statistics shown in Table 5.1 are obtained by first regressing the model 
specification with ordinary least squares in order to obtain the residuals which are used as a 
proxy for the variances. The log of the squared residuals from the regression is used as the 
dependent variable in an ordinary least squares regression where the log of the loan amount 
(A) is the independent variable. The hypothesis that A is contributing to the heteroskedasticity 
in the data is accepted if its coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero. 
3When data are heteroskedastic, their variances are not constant over observations. As a 
result, ordinary least squares places more weight on the observations with large variances 
(continued ... ) 
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straightforwardly; but the t-statistics should be interpreted conservatively 
because they overestimate the significance of the results. For the interested 
reader, Appendix C contains the generalized least squares results (which 
reduce the heteroskedasticity) for the tests shown in this chapter. 
Table 5.1: Park-Giejser Results where Log(Al is the Dependent Variable, T -Statistics in 
Parenthesis (Observations = 1,6701 
Full SamQie > $1 Million < $1 Million 
Portfolio Theory 0.176203 -0.353437 0.135835 
(6.811* (-2.441** (3. 1 71* 
Credit Rationing 0.034245 -0.365671 0.210792 
(1.351 (-1.771** (5.011* 
H,K&M Customer 0.127444 -0.104367 0.176327 
Relationship (4.791* (-0.6101 (4.341* 
Sharpe Customer 0.135594 -0.324195 0.209164 
Relationship (5.251* (-1 .991** (4.841* 
• Significant at the 1 percent level. 
• • Significant at the 5 percent level. 
• • • Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Regression Results for Portfolio Theory, Credit Rationing, and 
Customer Relationship Theories 
This section considers whether the signs of the coefficients in each 
model are consistent with those hypothesized by the theory and then tests 
whether any of the models provides the greatest amount of explanatory 
3( ••• continued) 
relative to those with small variances. This weighting system causes the parameter estimates 
to be inefficient--they are not associated with a minimum variance. 
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power. The results shown in this section are not consistent with the notion 
that banks price loans relative to portfolio theory. However, the results are 
consistent with credit rationing and customer relationship theories. The 
three theories are considered in turn. 
Portfolio Theory 
The test of the portfolio specification used in this study provides no 
evidence that loan prices are positively related to risk. As shown in column 
one of Table 5.2, the coefficient associated with VAR is statistically 
significantly different from zero and inversely related to the expected return 
on the loan while the hypothesis calls for a positive coefficient. The 
coefficient for V AR2 is also negative, but it is not statistically significant. 
Although these results are contrary to basic financial theory, they are 
suggested by banking industry observers who say that banks price their best 
customers' paper too low and their worst customers' paper too high.4 
The definition of expected return and variance used in this study is set 
forth by portfolio theory. However, the variables used to calculate the 
loan's expected return and variance are broader than those used by banks. 
Specifically, the expected return is based on the risk rating the bank applies 
to the loan, the type of collateral associated with the loan, and the recovery 
amount of the loan if it defaults--an approach that explicitly incorporates 
4For example, see Foss (1992), Portfolio Valuation Handbook (1989) and Rose (1992). 
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Table 5.2: Ordinary Least Squares Results where the Dependent Variable is the Expected Return 
on the Loan, T -Statistics In Parenthesis (Observations = 1 ,6701 
Portfolio Credit Customer Relationships 
Theory Rationing H.K&M 
� 
Intercept 3.547293 -2.067980 3.399496 4.038350 







A -0.000000 -0.000000 -0.000000 -0.000000 
(-16.29) * (-3.04)* (-12.231* (-13.23)* 
M -0.001293 -0.002956 -0.002458 -0.002362 











Log(TIMEI -0.105007 I 
(-3.42)* 
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.58 0.42 0.40 
F-Statistic 600.13* 569.67* 235.76* 372.91 * 
• Significant at the 1 percent level. 
• • Significant at the 5 percent level. 
• • • Significant at the 1 0 percent level. 
79 
more information than most banks probably use to price loans.5 
Consequently, the calculation of the expected return and variance may be 
biasing the results. Theoretically, however, the contract interest rate and 
the cost of funds used by banks to price loans should implicitly incorporate 
default probability and recovery rates. The difference between the definition 
used in this study and that which banks use allows further tests that shed 
light on the surprising results from portfolio theory. These tests are 
presented later in this chapter. 
The second measure of portfolio pricing, CORR, is positive and 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. This 
result should be discounted, however, because t-statistics are overestimated 
in the presence of heteroscedasticity. CORR measures the correlation 
between the return on the bank's loan portfolio and the change in the credit 
worthiness of firms in the same industry group. The positive relationship 
suggests that the pricing practices of the case study bank might have taken 
into consideration the correlation between the industry in which the 
borrower is a member and the bank's total loan portfolio. However, the 
heteroscedastic-consistent results shown in Appendix C indicate that the 
coefficient is not statistically significantly different from zero. The 
insignificance of this variable is consistent with the banking literature which 
indicates that banks have only recently begun to consider the impact on 
6The loan pricing examples shown in Table 8.1 of Appendix 8, for example, do not consider 
the impact of collateral recovery in loan pricing. 
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individual loans of the return to their total loan portfolio. 6 
The variables, A and M were included in each of the regressions to 
control for the size and maturity of the loans. Both variables were 
statistically significantly different from zero and inversely related to the 
expected return on the loans in each regression specified in Table 5.2. In 
fact, this relationship held true for every regression that was run for this 
study irrespective of how the sample was subdivided. These findings 
provide strong support that the expected return increases as the loan size 
and maturity decreases. 
The relationship between the expected return and the amount of the 
loan can be explained from several different points of view. First, smaller 
loans may be associated with smaller firms that are considered riskier than 
larger firms. Second, as suggested by customer relationship theories, larger 
loans contribute more to the bank's long-run profits. Thus, they are charged 
less in the short run in an attempt by the bank to retain the preferred 
customer. Third, increased competition for larger loans might have driven 
down the expected return for these preferred loans. The increased 
competition includes banks as well as other financial markets, such as 
commercial paper. Finally, this finding is also consistent with the theory 
that large loans are associated with relatively lower interest rates because of 
economies of scale. 
6For example, see Gallinger and Morgan (1993), Larr and Stampleman (1993), and 
Mersman (1991 ). 
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The regressions performed for this study also provide strong support 
that the expected return on loans is inversely related to the maturity of the 
loan. This result is opposite the expected result: longer loans are 
associated with higher returns because they possess a greater probability of 
default. The bond defaults shown in Table 4.2 clearly show this relationship 
between default and time. According to officials at the case study bank, 
however, short-term loans are preferred over long-term loans. 
Consequently, only the bank's best customers are granted loans with 
relatively long maturities. As suggested by customer relationship theories, 
preferred customers are granted lower interest rates. The lower interest 
rates translate into lower expected returns for the bank. 
Credit Rationing 
The regression results for credit rationing specification shown in Table 
5.2 are consistent with the notion that banks control risk by denying credit 
to the riskiest borrowers and use the contract interest rate as a signal of a 
borrower's riskiness. The theory of credit rationing, which assumes 
asymmetric information, suggests that beyond a maximum interest rate, 
banks do not lend because higher rates do not compensate for adverse 
selection and moral hazard. 
Results consistent with credit rationing can be found in three different 
relationships. First, weak support for credit rationing would be indicated by 
an upward sloping contract interest rate� Second, if the bank does not 
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ration credit properly, a parabolic relationship would exist between the 
expected return on the loan and the contract interest rate. Third, a negative 
sign on the coefficient of the squared interest rate would also support credit 
rationing by indicating the relationship is nonmonotonic and loans are not 
extended beyond a certain interest rate. 
The results shown in column two of Table 5.2 provide weak support 
for credit rationing. The contract interest rate (RATE) is positive and 
statistically significantly different from zero. However, a statistically 
insignificant relationship exists between RATE2 and the expected return. (A 
joint test for RATE and RA TE2 was rejected.) 
Customer Relationship Theories 
Two model specifications of customer relationships are considered in 
Table 5.2. The first model is denoted H,K&M because it relies on theories 
presented by Hodgman ( 1961) and Kane and Malkiel ( 1965). The second 
model specification is based on Sharpe ( 1990). 
According to the H,K&M theories of customer relationships, certain 
customer characteristics contribute more to a bank's long-term profitability 
than others. Thus, the relevant marginal calculation of granting a loan is not 
whether the additional expected profit from making the loan outweighs the 
increased risk, but the importance of the characteristics of the customer to 
the bank's long-run profits. Specifically, large accounts are preferred to 
small ones, growing accounts are more valuable than declining ones, larger 
83 
deposits are preferred to smaller deposits, and old accounts are preferred to 
new accounts. Consequently, one would expect banks to charge lower 
contract loan rates to customers with these favorable characteristics; and in 
the short-run, these preferred customers would be associated with a smaller 
expected return than the less preferred customers. 
The regression results shown in column three of Table 5.2 provide 
mixed support for customer relationship theories. As mentioned earlier, the 
relationship between the expected return on the loan and its size is negative 
and statistically significantly different from zero in all of the model 
specifications used in this study. According to customer relationship 
theories, customers with large loan amounts are charged a relatively lower 
interest rate because they are preferred. Thus, the expected return on these 
loans is inversely related to the amount of the loan. 
Projected industry growth (GROWTH) is the wrong sign and is not 
statistically significantly different from zero. Thus, the results do not 
provide support that the more preferred faster growing firms may be 
associated with a smaller return because they are expected to grow over the 
years and contribute more to the long-term profits of banks than slowly 
growing firms. 
The sign of the coefficient for the account's deposits (DEPOSITS) is 
consistent with the customer relationship theory. DEPOSITS is statistically 
significantly different from zero and inversely related to the expected return. 
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Similar to the loan size argument, these customers are granted a lower 
contract rate because of their long-term contribution to the bank's profits. 7 
The length of the customer relationship is not statistically significantly 
different from zero but negatively related to the loan's expected return.8 
According to customer relationship theories, longer-term relationships 
provide greater opportunity for profits. Thus, these customers are charged 
less in the short run. 
The second model specification of the customer relationship theory 
(Sharpe, 1990) simply states that bank customers become informationally 
captured by the bank that provides it with loans. Because of asymmetric 
information, the bank that loans to a customer learns more about that 
customer over time than do other banks. Thus, the bank that loans to the 
high quality firm offers it a lower rate, when compared with other banks; but 
the contract rate would be even lower if competing banks knew the true 
high quality of the customer. As a result, banks charge their better 
customers--those that become informationally captured--a relatively high rate 
7Customer relationship theories also suggest that customers with less deposit variability are 
preferred. Deposit variability (DEPSTE) is not included in the customer relationship 
specification because only 899 loans were associated with the data required to calculate 
deposit variability. A separate customer relationship regression was run with the 899 
observations and it indicates that DEPSTE is statistically significantly different from zero at the 
1 percent level. (DEPOSITS were not included in this regression because of multicollinearity.) 
Moreover, DEPSTE is negatively related to the expected return. The result is opposite that 
suggested by customer relationship theory: customers with lower deposit volatility are 
preferred customers who receive a lower contract interest rate than nonpreferred customers. 
8The form of this variable may be misspecified because the Sharpe customer relationship 
results indicate TIME is inversely and statistically significantly related to the expected return 
when TIME is in log form. 
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compared with new customers. 
The results shown in the fourth column of Table 5.2 do not support 
Sharpe's theory. The length of the customer relationship (log(TIME)) is 
statistically significant but inversely related to the loan's expected return. 
J-Test and Cox-Test 
The J-test and Cox-test consider whether any of the theories tested in 
this study provide significantly more explanatory power in commercial loan 
pricing. (See pages 69 through 73 for a further explanation of non-nested 
tests.) As mentioned earlier, the model specification for portfolio theory and 
Sharpe's (1990) customer relationship theories provide coefficients that are 
statistically significantly different from zero, but signs opposite those 
hypothesized by their respective theories (see Chapter IV). Because these 
model specifications fail to explain loan pricing as proposed by theory, they 
are not included in the non-nested tests. 
Table 5.3: Results of J-Test: Predicted Values for Re-estimated Equations, T-Statistics in Parenthesis 
Dependent Variable: Expected Return on Loans 
H0: Credit Rationing 
H,: H,K&M Customer Relationship 
H0: H,K&M Customer Relationship 
H,: Credit Rationing 
• Significant at the 1 percent level. 
• • Significant at the 5 percent level. 








(1 . 64) 
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Table 5.4: Results of Cox Test (q Statistic) 
Dependent Variable: Expected Return on Loans 
H0: Credit Rationing 
H,: H,K&M Customer Relationship 
H0: H,K&M Customer Relationship 
H,: Credit Rationing 




The results of the J-test presented in Table 5.3 indicate that the credit 
rationing specification provides more explanatory power than the M,K&M 
customer relationship specification. The null hypothesis that the credit 
rationing specification contains greater explanatory power is accepted over 
the H,K&M customer relationship specification because the predicted value 
of H,K&M is not statistically significantly different from zero when added to 
the credit rationing specification. In contrast, the null hypothesis that the 
customer relationship specification contains more explanatory power is 
rejected in favor of credit rationing because the predicted value of credit 
rationing is statistically significant at the 1 percent level when added to the 
H,K&M customer relationship specification. 
The results of the Cox-test shown in Table 5.4 also indicate that the 
credit rationing specification provides the greatest amount of explanatory 
power. The q-value of -2.003 indicates that the null hypothesis that the 
credit rationing models contains the greatest amount of explanatory power 
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should be accepted over the alternative hypothesis that the H,K&M 
customer relationship theory provides the greatest amount of explanatory 
power. When the hypotheses are switched, the q-statistic of -149.98 
indicates that the null hypothesis of the H,K&M customer relationship theory 
should be rejected in favor of credit rationing. 
Further Tests of loan Pricing 
The remainder of this chapter considers three additional questions 
related to loan pricing. First, did the calculation of expected return account 
for the lack of evidence in this study that banks price loans relative to risk? 
Second, are collateralized loans priced differently than noncollateralized 
loans? Finally, are loans from larger firms, which are usually associated with 
more information, priced differently than loans from smaller firms, which are 
usually associated with less information? 
Calculation of Expected Return 
The definition of the expected return on the loan used in this study is 
broader than that used in previous studies of loan pricing and is also broader 
than that used by most banks. In earlier studies, the premium had been 
used to measure a bank's return on its loans, mainly because further 
information was not available (for example, Berger and Udell, 1989). 
However, the premium does not explicitly take into account such factors as 
the default probability or the recovery on the loan in the case of default 
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because of the subjective nature of risk evaluations (see Table 5.5).9 If, as 
suggested by industry observers, banks do not currently incorporate the 
default probability related to loans (Altman, 1993), then a regression which 
Table 5.5: Two Ways to Determine the Return on a Loan 
Expected Return 
Calculation: ( 1-d)(i-i"} + (d)(IRR-i"} 
• Default Probability (d) - determined by applying the loan risk rating and the 
maturity of the loan to corporate default tables (see pages 57 and 58 for a 
more detailed explanation of this process). 
• Risk Rating - an integer from one to eight where one is assigned to the 
least risky loans. Ratings are assigned by the bank's account managers. 
The ratings are based on financial measures and other firm-specific 
information. 
• 
Premium (i-i"} - defined below as the contract interest rate less the cost of 
funds. 
• Internal Rate of Return (IRR) - the return on the loan if default occurs. It 
assumes default occurs aher 34 percent of the loan has been paid. The 
total recovery rate of the loan is dependent on the type of collateral 
associated with the loan. 
Premium 
Calculation: (i-i.) 
• Cost of Funds (i') - based on the yield of a government bond with a 
maturity eQual to that of the proposed commercial loan plus a factor which 
covers the cost of insurance and brokerage fees. 
• Rate (i) - the contract interest rate on the loan, which is based on the risk 
rating but does not estimate recovery in the case of default. 
uses the premium instead of the expected return as the dependent variable 
will be associated with an increased error variance. 
9Banks can calculate default probabilities and the expected recovery on loans in the case 
of default. However, the historical data needed to make such calculations have not been 
gathered and stored by banks. 
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The first column of Table 5.6 presents the results of the portfolio 
theory regression as specified for this study where the expected return is the 
dependent variable. The second column contains the results when the 
premium is used as the dependent variable. The statistical significance and 
Table 5.6: Reconsidering the Portfolio Theory Specification 
Ordinary Least Squares Results. T -Statistics in Parenthesis (Observations = 1,670) 
De[!eng!;lnt V§!ri§!ble� 
Ex[!ected Return Premium Ex[!ected Return Premium 
Intercept 3.547293 3.192322 4.031320 1.418214 
(61.14)* (63.13)* (17.50)* (9.20)* 
VAR -0.015015 0.000337 
(-33.09)* (0.85) 
VAR2 -0.000000 0.000014 
(-0.01) (9.70)* 
RISK -0.190320 0.455177 
(-3.30)* (11.86)* 
CORR 0.537148 0.332567 0.294687 0.559346 
(2.27)** ( 1.61) (0.96) (2.73)* 
A -0.000000 -0.000000 -0.000000 -0.000000 
(-16.28)* (-17.45)* (-13.58)* (-14.90)* 
MATURITY -0.001293 -0.000157 -0.002394 0.000108 
(-18.77)* (-2.62)* (-31.74)* (2.14)** 
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.20 0.40 0.22 
F-Statistic 600.13* 84.56* 279.74* 116.17* 
• Significant at the 1 percent level. 
.. Significant at the 5 percent level. 
• • • Significant at the 1 0 percent level. 
signs of the coefficients differ. When PREMIUM is used as the dependent 
variable, V AR is positive and insignificant while V AR2 is positive and 
statistically significantly different from zero. These results suggest that as 
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the risk (defined as the variance) related to the loan increases, the premium 
also increases as indicated by portfolio theory. Thus, the way expected 
return is measured may be affecting the results. However, the error 
estimate associated with the regression when the premium is used as the 
dependent variable supports the view that the premium is a less accurate 
measure than the expected return. The increased error associated with the 
premium is evident in the estimated residual variance of the regression 
which is represented by a smaller adjusted R2 and F-statistic when compared 
with the regression that uses the expected return as the dependent variable. 
The measure of risk (V AR) used in this study also may be broader 
than that used by banks because it explicitly takes into account the default 
probability of the loan as well as the recovery amount related to the loan. 
As noted in Table 5.5, the case study bank denotes risk by assigning each 
loan an integer from one to eight where one is the least risky category. 
Ratings are assigned by account managers and are based on financial 
measures and other firm-specific information. 
The third and fourth columns in Table 5. 6 replace V AR and V AR2 
with RISK, the bank's measure of risk that ranges from one to eight. When 
the premium is used as the dependent variable, a positive and statistically 
significant relationship exists between the premium and RISK. This 
relationship suggests that the loans of the case study bank are priced 
relative to risk if the bank's risk rating properly accounts for all of the risk 
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involved with the loan. The fourth column of Table 5.6 indicates that the 
case study bank's risk rating is statistically significant and inversely related 
to expected return, which incorporates default probabilities and expected 
recovery rates. 
The difference between the regression results presented in the last 
two columns of Table 5.6 suggest that default probability and recovery 
amounts may not be adequately incorporated into loan pricing. This result is 
not surprising, given the difficulty of obtaining historical information on loan 
defaults. According to Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990, p. 843): 
Even in insurance markets, where actuarial data are available to 
measure risk, significant variation are sometimes observed in 
the premia charged for the same risk. All the more so, 
competition in loan markets will not always eliminate errors in 
borrower classifications. 
Collateral and Loan Pricing 
Two theories propose opposing views of the impact of collateral on 
loan pricing. Stiglitz and Weiss ( 1981) posit that increasing collateral 
requirements beyond some point may cause a bank's expected return to 
decline because higher collateral requirements decrease the average degree 
of risk aversion of the pool of borrowers or encourages borrowers to 
undertake riskier projects. In contrast, Sarro ( 1976) argues that collateral 
acts as an incentive for borrowers to repay their loans; and Boot, Thakor, 
and Udell (1991) suggest that firms use collateral to obtain more favorable 
loan terms. In the latter two studies, the expected return on collateralized 
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loans is expected to be lower than that of non-collateralized loans. 
A t-statistic is used to test the equality of the means of the expected 
return of these two independent samples: loans with collateral requirements 
and loans without collateral. Table 5. 7 compares the means of the expected 
return for all loans and subdivides the data by risk ratings one through four. 
The results suggest that collateralized loans are associated with smaller 
Table 5.7: Comparing the Means of the Expected Return on Loans by Bank Risk Rating 
Risk-Rating No Collateral Collateralized T -S!atistic 
All Loans 2.98 1.00 16.80* 
Rated 1 3.12 0.06 4.28* 
Rated 2 3.04 0.77 8.89* 
Rated 3 2.60 0.86 11.37* 
Rated 4 3.31 1.23 10.12. 
*Significant at the 1 percent level. 
• • *Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Table 5.8: Comparing the Means of the Premium on Loans by Bank Risk Rating 
Risk-Rating No Collateral Collateralized T -Sta!istic 
All Loans 3.23 2.99 2.24** 
Rated 1 3.12 0.07 4.37* 
Rated 2 3.06 0.89 8.57* 
Rated 3 2.82 2.64 1.38 
Rated 4 3.56 3.35 1.23 
*Significant at the 1 percent level. 
• *Significant at the 5 percent level. 
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expected returns than noncollateralized loans. In other words, collateral is 
associated with a higher expected payback and thus lower perceived risk. 
These results support Barra, and Boot, Thakor, and Udell. This relationship 
held true for the total sample as well as each individual risk rating. 
A comparison of the means of the premium on loans provided similar 
results. As shown in Table 5.8, loans with collateral were associated with 
statistically significantly smaller premiums than those without collateral. 
This relationship, however, was not significant for loans with risk ratings 
three and four. 
Firm Size and Loan Pricing 
Large firms are expected to be associated with relatively more 
information than small firms because the larger firms are more often publicly 
traded. Unfortunately, the size of the firm associated with each loan in the 
database is not available. However, the study makes the same assumption 
used by. previous studies that larger loans are associated with larger firms. 
Consequently, the regressions are recalculated for portfolio theory, credit 
rationing, and customer relationships where the sample is divided between 
loans greater than or equal to $1 million and those that are less than $1 
million (see Tables 5.9 through 5.12). 
The regressions that are subdivided by size provide results similar to 
those already reported in the case of customer relationships as defined by 
Sharpe (Table 5.2). The regression results of the subdivided data do not 
94 
support customer relationship theory as suggested by Sharpe. The 
differences in the results when the data are subdivided by size of the model 
specifications for portfolio theory, credit rationing, and customer relationship 
(Hodgman, Kane and Malkiel) are explained in turn. 
Table 5.9 indicates that the portfolio specification results differ when 
loans are split by size. In the case of loans larger than $1 million, CORR is 
Table 5.9: Portfolio Theory: Results of Ordinary Least Squares by Loan Size where the 
Dependent Variable is the Expected Return on the Loan, T-Statistics 
in Parenthesis 
Loan Size 
> =$1 Million < $1 Million 
Intercept 1.576070 4.285988 
(12.39). (69.70)• 
VAR -0.010704 -0.014650 
(-9.00)• (-34.49)• 
VAR2 -0.000002 0.000002 
(-0.44) (1.61) 
CORR -1.499283 0.679206 
(-2.91)• (2.99)• 
A -0.000000 -0.000003 
(-3.22)• (-14.68)• 
M -0.001030 -0.001738 
(-6.25)• (-25.78)• 
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.73 
F-Statistic 72.89. 768.11. 
Observations 257 1413 
• Significant at the 1 percent level. 
• • Significant at the 5 percent level. 
• • • Significant at the 1 0 percent level. 
statistically significant and inversely related to the expected return which 
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suggests that the largest loans are not priced relative to the risk contribution 
they provide to the overall portfolio. This result might have occurred 
because the largest loans comprise the largest proportion of the portfolio. 
In terms of credit rationing, Table 5.10 indicates that a parabolic 
relationship exists between the expected return and the contract interest 
rate of the largest loans. For small loans, however, the relationship between 
expected return and the contract rate is convex. This finding implies that 
the marginal return on the small loans increases as the variance increases. 
Table 5.10: Credit Rationing: Results of Ordinary Least Squares by Loan Size where the Dependent 
Variable is the Expected Return on the Loan, T-Statistics in Parenthesis 
Loan Size 
> = $1 Million < $1 Million 
Intercept -7.381894 1.317769 
(-6.06)* (2.04)*. 
RATE 2.821347 0.192749 
(6.26)* (1.27) 
RATE2 -0.203454 0.025252 
(-5.13)* (2.86)* 
A -0.000000 -0.000002 
(0.72) (-7.64)* 
M -0.002553 -0.002986 
(-16.97)* (-40.52)* 
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.59 
F-Statistic 84.73* 510.54* 
Observations 257 1413 
• Significant at the 1 percent level. 
• • Significant at the 5 percent level. 
• • • Significant at the 1 0 percent level. 
On the larger loans, however, the marginal return decreases as the variance 
increases. This finding suggests that the case study bank may extend loans 
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to large customers beyond the point of its maximum expected return--a 
practice which does not occur for smaller customers as suggested by the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient for RATE2 in the regression of 
loans that are less than $1 million. In other words, large loans may not be 
rationed as often as small loans. 
Table 5.1 1: Customer Relationship (H,K&MI: Results of Ordinary Least Squares where the 
Dependent Variable is the Expected Return on Loan, T-Statistics in Parenthesis 
Loan Amount 
> - $1 Million < $1 Million 
Intercept 1.494124 4.189849 
(8.50)* (42.641* 
GROWTH 0.003182 -0.000934 
(0.70) (-0.47) 
DEPOSITS -0.000000 -0.000000 
(-1.64) (-2.04)*. 
TIME -0.000055 0.000015 
(-1.61) (0.83) 
A -0.000000 -0.000003 
(-2.00)*. (-13.24)* 
M -0.002112 -0.002781 
(-13.57)* (-35.29)* 
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.50 
F-Statistic 41.19* 282.76* 
Observations 257 1410 
• Significant at the 1 percent level. 
• • Significant at the 5 percent level. 
• • • Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Table 5.11 provides similar results regarding the customer relationship 
theory (Hodgman, Kane, and Malkiel). The results indicate that the largest 
loans are priced differently than those that are less than $1 million. In the 
regression of the largest loans, DEPOSITS is not statistically significantly 
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different from zero when regressed against the expected return and it is 
significant in the regression where loans are less than $1 million. This 
suggests that pricing based on customer relationships is more important for 
smaller firms. This may be true for several reasons. First banks may 
encourage customer relationships with smaller firms in order to gain more 
information about them because information is scarce relative to larger firms. 
Second, larger firms are able to "shop around" and use several different 
banks for their service needs. Third, the size of large customers allows them 
access to public markets for loan needs. 
Table 5.12: Customer Relationship (Sharpe): Results of Ordinary Least Squares where the Dependent 
Variable is the Expected Return on Loan, T-Statistics in Parenthesis 
Loan Amount 
> = $ 1 Million < $1 Million 
Intercept 2.477525 4.468982 
(5.35). (1 9.87)• 
Log(TIME) -0.169990 -0.044208 
(-2.77)• (-1 .43) 
A -0.000000 -0.000003 
(-2.04)•. (-1 3.76)• 
M -0.002040 -0.002756 
(-13.41)• (-35.39)• 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.50 
F-Statistic 67.40. 470.14 
Observations 257 1413 
• Significant at the 1 percent level. 
.. Significant at the 5 percent level. 
• • • Significant at the 10 percent level. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONClUSIONS AND IMPliCATIONS 
The empirical results of this study provide some rationale for the way 
the case study bank prices commercial loans. Specifically, the results are 
consistent with the credit rationing and customer relationship specifications 
used in this study. Little support is found that commercial loans are priced 
as described by the portfolio theory specification used in this study. 
More generally, the empirical results of this study provide little support 
that banks price commercial loans relative to risk in the strict sense 
described by portfolio theory. This result is anticipated by Jaffee and Stiglitz 
(1990) who argue that loan markets do not function like other markets. In 
fact, the data used in this study suggest that as the riskiness of a loan 
increases, the expected return to the bank decreases. This inverse 
relationship provides some support for those who contend that banks price 
the paper of their best customers too high and their worst customers too 
low (Foss, 1992). 
Some support is found for the customer relationship view that banks 
offer relatively low interest rate loans to those customers whose 
characteristics are expected to offer most to the long-run profits of the 
bank. Consequently, when considered aside from risk, banks do grant their 
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best customers lower interest rates. The empirical results also provide weak 
support for credit rationing which suggests that the contract interest rate on 
the loan acts as a signal of credit quality, and banks ration borrowers that 
exceed a certain risk level. Finally, the results of the non-nested Cox-test 
suggest that the credit rationing specification used in this study provides 
more explanatory power regarding the expected return on commercial loan 
prices than does the customer relationship specification. 
The fact that bank loans exist in illiquid markets with scarce 
information provides one explanation for why this study found little support 
for portfolio theory but statistically significant explanatory power in 
customer relationships and credit rationing. The remainder of this chapter 
uses the concept of asymmetric information to draw conclusions and 
implications from the empirical results. 
Illiquid Markets and Asymmetric Information 
The findings described in this study are best understood when 
considered within the commercial loan environment which is characterized 
by illiquid assets with asymmetric information. According to Murton (1989, 
p. 2 and 3), 
... banks specialize in lending to a unique class of borrowers. 
For these borrowers, 'public information on the economic 
conditions and prospects of such borrowers is so limited and 
expensive that the alternative of issuing marketable securities is 
either nonexistent or unattractive' [Goodhart, 1987, p. 86]. 
Because these borrowers cannot easily convey information 
about their own creditworthiness to lenders (or conversely, 
because lenders cannot easily ascertain the creditworthiness), 
100 
there are agency costs associated with the borrowing and 
lending arrangements available to them. Banks alleviate these 
costs by specializing in evaluating and monitoring this class of 
borrowers. 
Bernanke (1983) also notes that banks are a mechanism to overcome the 
information problems associated with some assets that would otherwise be 
nonmarketable. Consequently, the very nature of commercial loans makes 
their pricing and risk assessment very difficult. 
Credit evaluation is an essential part of the process of pricing an 
illiquid security, particularly because a borrower's risk classification 
determines the interest rate charged which, in turn, determines the 
efficiency of credit allocation in the economy. 1 Banks, however, have not 
developed databases of reliable historical information about the default and 
recovery rates associated with past lending. 2 Even if banks had kept good 
records, Rosenberg and Kravitt ( 1993) note that it is difficult to estimate the 
risk of loss on commercial loans because they are heterogeneous. 
Moreover, a certain amount of subjectivity is incorporated into the loan 
assessment process as various loan officers interpret the data surrounding a 
prospective loan applicant. 
In addition to the lack of information, the pricing of commercial loans 
has intensified because of increased competition. Not only do banks face 
'See, Jaffee and Modigliani ( 1 969), Jaffee and Stiglitz ( 1 990), Kao ( 1 992), and Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981). 
2See, for example, Morsman (1991), Larr and Stampleman (1993a and 1993b), and 
Rosenberg and Kravitt ( 1 993). 
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competition with more than 11 ,000 other commercial banks that exist in the 
United States, but competition from nonbanking sources has risen. 
Commercial paper, for example, made up 3 percent of short-term borrowings 
by nonfinancial firms prior to 1966 and that figure rose to 1 5 percent by 
1991. In fact, Beckett and Morris ( 1992) provide support for the view that 
good substitutes for bank loans have increasingly become available over the 
past decade. 
Lack of Evidence for Portfolio Theory 
The illiquid nature of commercial bank loans, the associated lack of 
historical data, and increasing competition provide possible explanations for 
why this study found little support for the basic financial relationship 
between risk and return. In essence, portfolio theory may not be very 
effective in explaining commercial loan pricing because the market for loans 
does not possess the level of efficiency that is found in the capital markets 
for which this theory most directly applies (see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1: Comparing the Characteristics of Commercial Bank Loans and Efficient Capital 
Markets 
Method of Setting Price 
Method of Setting Risk 
Buyer's Relationship to Price 
Information 
Number of Buyers/Sellers 
















Flannery (1985) notes that practical considerations complicate the 
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application of portfolio theory to bank loan selection and pricing decisions. 
For example, portfolio theory assumes investors are "price takers" because 
the market sets the price relative to risk and investors purchase assets at the 
going price. Commercial bank loans, however, do not trade in public 
markets.3 Instead, the bank examines each applicant's financial 
characteristics in order to determine its creditworthiness and then 
determines the contract interest rate. Moreover, Flannery notes that 
portfolio models do not account for the fact that a bank's skill at analyzing 
credit and its ability to bargain affects the risk-return characteristics of the 
loans in its portfolio. 
Credit markets also deviate from the standard models of supply and 
demand because interest rates indicate what the borrower promises to repay 
rather than what he will actually repay (Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990, p. 838): 
If credit markets were like standard markets, then interest rates 
would be the "prices" that equate the demand and supply for 
credit. However, an excess demand for credit is common-­
applications for credit are frequently not satisfied. As a result, 
the demand for credit may exceed the supply at the market 
interest rate. 
Theories of portfolio selection also assume that all relevant and 
necessary information about potential investments is available. Indeed, the 
availability of information is a basic assumption that leads to proper pricing. 
By contrast, though, bankers work with asymmetric information. Table 5.6 
31n the last few years, banks have started to securitize some commercial loans which 
enables the loans to be sold more easily in public markets. 
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suggests that loans might not be priced relative to risk if the case study 
bank did not adequately account for the recovery amount associated with 
the loan in the case of default. Intensifying the difficulties in pricing loans 
under conditions of asymmetric information is the apparent existence of an 
oversupply of loanable funds which has, most likely, driven the price of 
commercial loans below its associated risk level. 4 
The results obtained in this study for the portfolio specification are 
consistent with those stated by observers in the banking industry and thus 
are probably representative of most banks. With regard to risk and pricing, 
observers have found great variation in pricing practices between banks. 
Three implications result from the lack of evidence for portfolio 
theory. First, banks can reduce the variability of returns on their loan 
portfolio by using more objective methods of measuring the individual risk of 
the loan and by considering the risk of the loan relative to the entire loan 
portfolio. According to Chirinko and Guill (1991, p. 19), "Ignoring 
covariation [between a loan and the portfolio] would substantially understate 
risk premiums." The method used in Chapter IV of this study to determine 
the expected return on loans can be used by banks as a starting point to 
improve their measurement of risk on loans. Other studies which suggest 
similar methods include Altman (1993), Kao (1993), and Gallinger and 
4See, for example, Lipen and Mitchell ( 1 993), Wall Street Journal. 
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Morgan (1993).5 
Second, banks that possess more information will more accurately 
assess the risk and price of loans. In this regard, information about the loan 
applicant should be supplemented with economic information about the 
geographic market in which the applicant operates.6 Indeed, Harrison 
Young, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporations' director of resolutions, 
expects that fewer banks will be involved in commercial lending in the 
future, but "The new commercial lenders will specialize either regionally or 
by industry . . .  " (American Banker, October 1, 1993). Moreover, Nakamura 
( 1993, p. 3) argues that " ... the profitable lender is the one who best 
understands the businesses that borrowers are engaged in and the value of 
collateral that borrowers put up to guarantee loans." 
The third implication of the portfolio theory results described in this 
study is that increasing competition for commercial bank loans will continue 
to pressure banks to offer interest rates that are below the risk implied by 
the loan. Perhaps the force of competition, more than any other force, has 
driven banks to consider loans in the broader context of the entire customer 
relationship because pricing the loan in consideration of the entire 
6The basic concept of portfolio management as applied to bank portfolios is presented in 
Larr and Stamplemen ( 1993a and 1993b). 
6Ross (American Banker, October 2, 1 992) suggests that the loan portfolio should be 
analyzed in terms of its response to different economic events: "Industry and regional 
performance can be examined through simulation under a range of potential economic events, 
such as a significant shift in exchange rates, a Japanese financial collapse, a recession, or a 
pronounced regional downturn. • 
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relationship enables a bank to supplement its compensation for the risk. 7 
Customer Relationships Reduce Information Problems 
The results of this study also provide some support that customers 
whose characteristics imply greater long-run profits for the bank are granted 
lower interest rates than others. Thus, the long-run impact on profits is a 
more important determinant of granting a loan than is the risk of the loan. 
According to Kane and Malkiel (1965), a utility maximizing bank may agree 
to grant a loan to a preferred customer even though the customer's risk will 
cause the bank to experience an overall decrease in utility because not 
granting the loan will also decrease utility. The implication of the customer 
relationship approach is that banks can supplement low returns on loans by 
other services offered by the bank such as cash management. 
Customer relationships are also important to banks because they 
improve the banks ability to monitor their customers. Kane and Malkiel 
( 1965) argue that when a bank and customer develop a relationship through 
loans or deposits, the bank is able to discern the quality of the customer. 
Black (1975) and Fama (1985) also suggest that the historical relationship of 
a borrower as a depositor provides the bank with information that allows it 
to identify the risks of granting a loan to a particular firm and can lower the 
bank's monitoring costs of that firm. Within an environment of scarce 
7The desire to further compensate a bank for taking on a risky loan through the profits of 
additional services is likely to create tension between relationship managers and portfolio 
managers who may seek divergent goals. 
information, the information gained about a firm through the relationship 
provides the bank with the ability to more accurately price future loans. 
Credit Rationing 
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Credit rationing is also an outgrowth of an illiquid market with scarce 
information. Credit rationing proposes that the bank does not grant loans 
beyond a certain contract interest rate because, at a ceratin point, adverse 
selection and moral hazard increase the possibility that higher contract 
interest rates will be associated with losses that outweigh the expected 
return from the increase in interest rates. Thus, interest rates signal credit 
worthiness in the absence of more reliable information. Moreover, the 
relationship between the expected return and the contract rate suggests that 
banks can maximize their expected return by rationing. 
Credit rationing suggests that banks control risk by denying credit to 
the riskiest borrowers. The internal risk rating system that most banks use 
to assess the risk of commercial loans supports the credit rationing view. In 
the case study bank, for example, loans are assigned a risk rating from one 
through eight where one is the least risky. The bank's funds are rationed 
such that firms ranked five or higher are not typically granted a loan. 
The empirical tests in this study provide weak support for credit 
rationing. Specifically, the results indicate that the relationship between the 
contract interest rate and the expected return on the loan is positive. 
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Collateral and Pricing 
Finally, this study found that the expected return associated with 
collateralized loans is higher than that for loans without collateral. These 
results are consistent with Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) who argue that 
firms use collateral to obtain more favorable loan terms. In an environment 
of scarce information, collateral may decrease moral hazard thereby giving 
the borrower a greater incentive to repay his loans (Barro, 1976). 
Further Research Questions 
The results of this study suggest that further research is needed to 
more fully understand commercial loan pricing. For example, even though 
commercial loans are illiquid assets and exist in an environment of 
asymmetric information, can they be priced relative to risk? Recently, 
studies have begun to suggest ways for banks to more rigorously and 
objectively access commercial loan risk. Can such measures increase the 
efficiency of loan pricing? Alternatively, must loan pricing be considered an 
"art" because commercial loans are too heterogenous and mathematical 
tools are too general. 
A tangential topic to commercial loan pricing is competition. Has the 
increase in nonbank competition for loans that intensified in the 1970s and 
1980s caused banks to inaccurately price loans relative to risk? Specifically, 
if the least risky firms have moved to the more efficient bond markets, are 
the remaining smaller and more risky firms too difficult to price because of 
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asymmetric information? 
Government regulation may also play a role in explaining the results 
found in this study. Did the regulation of banks prior to the 1980s 
encourage inaccurate pricing of commercial loans? Is the banking industry 
still undergoing a transitory period in which they are learning to more 
accurately price loans because they can no longer rely on the protection of 
the government from outside competition? 
Finally, would actual commercial loan default probabilities improve the 
results of this study with regard to portfolio theory? As noted earlier, banks 
have only begun to collect default rates for commercial loans (this study 
used corporate bond default rates as a proxy). When commercial loan 
default rates become available, the empirical tests of this study should be 
replicated. 
Symbols in Text 
APPENDIX A 
GLOSSARY OF SYMBOLS 
d; = Probability that default will occur on loan i 
c· = Loan customers whose relationship is valued highly by the bank 
E(Rb) = Bank's expected return on a loan 
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F(Rg,8) = Bank's perception of the distribution of returns on a borrower's project 
f(Rg,8) = Density function associated with the above 
i. = Contract interest rate on the loan which is set by the bank 
i = Time value of money equal to the nominal rate of interest or cost of funds 












Initial loan amount 
Number of possible events 
Borrower's gross return on the investment 
Random event i 
Borrower's maximum rate of return on the investment 
Variance related to the expected return on loan i 
Variance on the loan portfolio 
Fraction of the portfolio represented by loan i 
The sum equal to full repayment of the loan contract (principal and 
interest) 
Risk associated with borrower's investment project 
Yield on investor's project which determines whether he/she will borrow 
Symbols in Regressions 
A; 
= Dollar amount of loan for loan i 
CORR = Correlation between the return on the bank loan portfolio and the credit 
risk of the industry in which the firm belongs 
DEPOSITS; = Total deposits associate with borrower i 
DEPSTE; = Standard deviation of month-end deposits for loan i 
E(R;l = Expected return on loan i 
GROWTH; = Projected growth rate for the borrower's industry 
i� = Contract interest rate on loan i 
M; = Maturity of loan i in days 
RP, = Return on the bank's loan portfolio at time t 
TIME; = Number of days the customer has held a loan or deposits with the bank 
VAR; Variance of the expected return on loan i 
P = Regression coefficient 
APPENDIX B 
METHODS USED BY BANKS TO PRICE COMMERCIAL LOANS 
Most financial assets are sold in markets where the forces of supply and 
demand drive their risk-adjusted price toward an equilibrium. In these markets, 
investors are enticed to hold risky assets by the relatively high expected returns 
they offer. Because such markets do not exist for most commercial loans, bankers 
must rely on their expertise and a variety of methods to price loans relative to risk. 
Theory suggests that for a loan portfolio to be priced efficiently, 1 the 
interest and fee income on its individual loans should incorporate 1) the bank's cost 
of funds, 2 2) other costs related to the loan (such as overhead), 3) compensation 
for specific risks that increase the volatility of the loan's expected returns, and 4) 
compensation for portfolio risk. The bank's cost of funds normally comprises the 
greatest portion of a loan's price and is easy to determine--it is equivalent to the 
yield on the U.S. government security with a maturity equal to that of the loan3 
1 Efficiency here means that the loan is priced exactly as it would be priced if all information 
were known. It is important to note that an efficiently priced loan is equivalent to its fair 
market price. Consequently, if a borrower were to request and obtain a lower interest rate, 
it would reduce the bank's expected profit. In making the decision to grant the loan, the bank 
would have to determine whether it could obtain a higher return if its resources were invested 
in an asset other than the loan. Also, an efficient portfolio is defined as the portfolio 
associated with the highest expected return of all portfolios available in a certain risk class, or 
the lowest risk of all portfolios available in a certain expected return class. 
2The bank's cost of funds is comprised of the risk-free rate (government bond rate) plus the 
additional cost of the bank to borrow funds which is based on its own risk rating. Naturally, 
the cost of funds varies by bank, giving some a competitive advantage over others in their 
pricing of loans. 
3Loans that are associated with a maturity of less than one year are generally priced relative 
to a shorter-term note such as the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). 
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plus a markup to account for the fact that loans to banks are riskier than loans to 
the U.S. government. Because the four remaining components of price are more 
difficult to determine, they are sometimes estimated intuitively or are not 
considered at all in the commercial loan pricing process. As a result, banks often 
price the loans of their best (lowest risk) customers too high and their worse 
(highest risk) customers too low. In either case, though, mispriced loans lead to 
the misallocation of assets in a bank's portfolio. The result is that the loan portfolio 
is less than optimal in terms of expected return risk and return. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the banking literature on current and 
proposed methods for pricing commercial loans. No one loan pricing model exists 
that is suitable for all loans and all banks. This chapter does not attempt to 
categorize loan pricing methods by bank size or customer type. Rather, it 
categorizes loan pricing methods into three groups that each emphasize one aspect 
of loan pricing but that must be used collectively to properly price loans. The first 
method, pricing to reflect profit, provides the basis of any decision to sell a product 
or a service: income and cost must be identified so that expected return can be 
determined. The second method, pricing to reflect specific risks, indicates that 
borrowers should be charged a premium for identifiable factors such as maturity 
and industry-type that tend to increase the risk that repayment will not occur as 
scheduled. The final method, pricing to reflect portfolio risk, indicates that the loan 
interest rate should incorporate a premium or discount to account for the variability 
an individual loan adds to or takes away from a bank's entire loan portfolio. Of the 
three methods described in this chapter, pricing to reflect portfolio risk possesses 
the least practical application in banking trade journals. 
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Pricing to Reflect Profitability 
The first step in properly pricing loans requires that income (interest charges 
and fees) and costs (direct and indirect costs associated with making, servicing, 
and collecting the loan as well as an approximation of possible default) be identified 
as precisely as possible so that a loan's profitability or yield can be determined. 
The loan can then be accepted or rejected based on some pre-determined target 
rate. 
Although the identification of costs and income seems relatively straight 
forward, this process can be complex. To begin the process, the bank must have 
an information system with which it collects, analyzes, and makes available 
relevant credit cost information to those pricing loans. The amount of information 
that is needed for the pricing process depends on whether the bank's strategy 
involves using relationship pricing or transaction pricing (also known as stand-alone 
pricing).4 
Relationship pricing is generally used by regional and community banks that 
tend to service the middle-to-lower customer loan market. These banks attempt to 
"cross sell" products to the customers they serve. A customer who uses the 
bank's cash management services, for example, would be encouraged to borrow. 
Accordingly, relationship pricing holds that customer services are interrelated and 
thus loans should be priced to account for this broad relationship.5 Consequently, 
4For examples, see Brick (1984), Ferrari (1992), Johnson and Grace (1990, 1991), Knight 
(1975), Rasmussen (1991), Rudis and Owens (1989). and Yang (1991). 
6As pointed out by Ferrari (1992), stand-alone pricing should be used in conjunction with 
relationship pricing. He argues that banks should not devote resources to unprofitable business 
lines. However, accepting a small loss from one aspect of a customer relationship is wise if 
another facet of the relationship with the same customer is extremely profitable. 
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this approach measures the effect of such items as the compensating balances6 
and cash management revenues (also called activity revenues)7 of all of the 
relationships a customer possesses with the bank to determine the "loan-
relationship" profitability. 
In contrast, some banks prefer to service only transaction loans.8 These 
transaction (merchant) banks adhere to the stand-alone pricing perspective which 
holds that customers evaluate each bank product separately and assumes that 
customers may use several institutions to meet their financial needs. Thus, each 
product is analyzed and priced independently of others to ensure its profitability. 
Because profitability pricing provides an in-depth framework of the income 
and costs that must be considered in loan pricing, two loan pricing examples are 
provided. The first is based on the stand-alone view, and the second holds the 
customer-relationship view. 
Stand-Alone Pricing Example 
The following numerical illustration from Brick (1984) shows how an 
estimated yield can be determined on commercial loans by using the stand-alone 
perspective. This example assumes a bank is considering a loan request for a 
three-year, $1-million revolving credit (see Table B.1). The bank requires a 
commitment fee of 1 /2 of 1 % per year on the unused portion of the commitment 
6A compensating balance is a noninterest-bearing deposit that a commercial loan customer 
is required to place in the bank according to the loan agreement. Most loans do not require 
compensating balances, particularly upper market (large) loans. 
7Cash management costs include such items as lock boxes, returned items, stop payments, 
and wire transfers. 
6Relationship banks make transaction loans as well, but with the expectation that they will 
lead to a relationship. 
and compensating balances of 7% of the commitment plus 5% of borrowings. 
Table 8.1: Stand-Alone Loan Pricing Example 
Type of loan: 
Commitment: 
Term: 
Contract Interest Rate: 
Accrual Method: 







1 . Interest Income 
$1 Million (.75)(.0781) 




1 .1 0 x Prime (Initial Prime is 7%) 
Actual/360 Method 
7.7% X (365/360) = 7.81% 
7.70% 
0.5% on Unused Portion of Commitment 
7% of Commitment + 5% of Borrowings 
75% (First Year) 
12% 
Convertible into 3-year, Fixed-Rate Term Loan at 
1.2 x Prime 
$ 58,575 
$1 Million (1-.75)(.005) 
Total Income 
B. Outlay 
1 . Average Loan Amount 
$1 Million (.75) 
2. Less: Net Demand Deposit Balances 
$1 Million (.07) 
$1 Million (. 75)(.05) 
Gross Demand Deposit 
Less: Reserve Req. @.12 
Net Demand Deposits 
Net Outlay 
C. Estimated Loan Yield (y) 










• When the actual/365 accrual method is used, the adjusted nominal rate is the same as the contract 
rate. 
Source: Brick (1 984). 
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The interest rate on the loan floats with the prime rate which is 7%9; and because 
the borrower's default and term risk justifies a price of 1.10 times prime, the initial 
contract rate on the loan is 7.7%.10 The bank uses the actual/360 accrual 
method so the adjusted nominal loan rate is (365/360) x 7.8% = 7.81%. Finally, 
about 75% of the commitment or $750,000 will be used during the first year of the 
loan. 
To estimate a loan yield (y), the bank's income must be determined net of 
compensating balances and reserve requirements. Table B. 1 shows that given an 
estimated first-year usage of 75% on a $1 million revolving loan, the interest and 
fee amounts contribute $59,825 in total income. The outlay needed for this loan is 
the average loan amount less the usable net demand deposit balances. 
Consequently, the net outlay for this example loan is $655,400, which produces an 
estimated yield of 9.13%. Of course, the effective yield would be higher because 
9Generally the contract price of a loan is set at a fixed or variable rate and then is not 
reconsidered until the loan is renewed. A relatively new concept called performance based 
pricing, however, attempts to give the borrower an incentive to improve his/her performance 
(and therefore decrease his/her risk rating) by promising to decrease the contract loan rate 
when certain performance measures are met. More frequently, though, a schedule is attached 
to the loan contract that spells out increases in the contract loan rate as the credit migrates 
from a high quality to a lower quality loan (risk increases). If the borrower is rated by a bond 
rating agency such as Moody's, then the bond rating is used as the performance base by which 
the loan price is adjusted. In the case of non-rated firms, relevant financial ratios are used as 
the measure of performance. 
101n this example, the riskless time value of money is incorporated into the prime rate, 
which is then adjusted based on the borrower's default and term risk. Using the prime rate 
rather than the risk-free rate as a basis for pricing the loan leads to imprecise pricing of risk 
because the spread between the target rate and the risk-free rate varies over time. For 
example, if the spread between the prime rate and the risk-free rate starts at 1 percent, then 
if the risk-free rate falls and the prime remains steady, the loans priced at 1 .1 times prime will 
be priced too high. 
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interest payments are generally made monthly or quarterly.11 
The stand-alone method requires information limited to the loan itself. 
Therefore, the calculations shown in Table 3.1 can be expressed in the following 
simple formula12: 
y = [ur + f(1-u)) I lu- (b1 + b2u)(1-R)) 
where y is the estimated loan yield, u is the estimated first-year commitment usage, 
r is the adjusted nominal rate, f is the commitment fee, b, is the compensating 
balance requirement on the total commitment, b2 is the compensating balance 
requirement on the borrowings, and A is the reserve requirement on the 
compensating balances. Thus, for the example used here: 
y 
= [(.75)(.0781) + (.005)(1-.75)) I [.75- (.07 + (.05)(.75))(1-.12)1 
= .59825 I .65540 = .0913 or 9.13%. 
An advantage of this pricing formula is that it allows bankers to determine 
the yield on different types of commercial loans with various combinations of costs 
and can be easily incorporated into a computer program. In essence, it ensures that 
a loan's spread covers its costs if payments are made as scheduled. Knight (1975), 
however, suggests that bank's perform more detailed analysis on their largest 
customers to insure that adequate profits are generated by the entire account 
relationship. 
1 1The effective rate Iii is determined by the following equation: 
i 
= [ 1 + (yIn) I" - 1 
where y is the estimated loan yield and n is the number of times per year interest is 
compounded. 
121f a revolving credit or an open line uses a fixed commitment fee based on the total 




Table 8.2 shows the elements of a customer-relationship profitability 
analysis as suggested by Knight. This analysis, which is typical of most, contains a 
detailed listing of sources and uses of funds, income, expenses, net income, and 
profitability measures. 
Although the mathematics of profitability analysis are simple, the items used 
to measure the relationships are difficult to determine. Moreover, one can debate 
how to measure the items in this analysis. Johnson and Grace ( 1990), for 
example, show that the treatment of deposit balances in a profitability analysis has 
a significant impact on the loan's expected yield. The "total funds" approach gives 
the customer credit for deposits and uses the total funds borrowed as the base on 
which to measure profitability. The "net borrowed funds" model, however, 
essentially credits customer deposits at the bank's cost of funds rate by assuming 
that the borrower only uses the difference between the loan balance and the 
deposit balance. As a result, the net borrowed funds approach overstates the 
profitability of a loan and understates the pricing. 
Summary 
A disadvantage of loan profitability analysis is that it requires the collection 
and analysis of a detailed set of data about loans. The strength of this analysis, 
however, can far outweigh the cost. Loan profitability analysis, whether 
relationship or stand-alone, indicates whether the income from a loan will cover 
costs if all interest and principle payments are made as scheduled. Moreover, it 
draws attention to the most profitable or unprofitable accounts and products, and 
thus allows more efficient allocation of resources. 
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Table 8.2: Customer-Relationship Profitability Analysis 
A. Sources and Uses of Funds 
1 . Average Loan Balances: $ 
2. Average Collected Balances: $ 
a. Investable Balance (x% reserve): $ 
--
3. Average Time Balance: $ 
--
a. Investable Balance (x% reserve): $ 
4. Total Loanable Funds (2a + 3a): $ 
--
5. Bank Funds Used by Customer (1 - 4): $ 
--
a. Allocated Capital (8% of 1 ): $ 
--
b. Funds Transferred from Pool (5 -5a): $ 
--
B. Income 
6. Gross Interest Income on Loans: $ 
--
7. Earnings on Deposit (x% of 4): $ 
--
8. Fees Paid: 
a. Service Charge Fees $ 
--
b. Loan Commitments $ 
--
c. Data Processing $ 
--
d. Total (8a + 8b + 8c): $ 
9. Total Income (6 + 7 + 8): $ 
--
c. Expenses 
10. Activity Costs from Account Analysis: $ 
--
11 . Interest Accrued on Time Deposits: $ 
--
12. Charge for Bank Funds Used: 
a. Allocated Capital (20% of 5a): $ 
--
b. Pool Funds (x% of 5b): $ 
c. Total (12a + 12b): $ 
--
13. Loan Handling Expenses: $ 
14. Cost of Fee Services: $ 
--
15. Data Processing: $ 
--
16. Total Expenses ( 1 0 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 15): $ 
--
D. Net Income 
17. Net Income Before Taxes (9 - 16): $ 
E. Profitability Measures 
18. Allocated Capital Index (17/5a): % 
--
19. Net Profits/Net Funds Used (17/5): % 
20. Net Profits/Gross Amount Borrowed ( 17/1): % 
21. Gross Profits/Net Funds Used [17 + 12c)/5): % 
Note: Activity (cash management) costs include items such as lockbox services, coin shipments, wire 
transfers, stop payments, and returned items. 
Source: Knight (1975). 
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Articles that explain methods of pricing to reflect costs, however, provide 
little information about how to price the risks of ·a loan. The next section presents 
loan pricing models that concentrate on pricing risk. 
Pricing to Reflect Specific Risks 
Financial theory indicates that the expected return on an investment 
increases as risk increases.13 A larger expected return is necessary to entice risk-
averse investors to hold an instrument whose returns have greater variability than 
instruments with lower risk. When investments are traded in efficient markets 
where information is accessible to all investors, the price of the investment reflects 
risk. Because most bank loans are not traded in an open market and exist in an 
environment of asymmetric information, market-driven measures of risk do not 
exist. Consequently, bankers must gather information such as current financial 
data about borrowers and relationships between industries in order to accurately 
assess and price the risk of each loan. As with determining costs related to a loan, 
the more accurate the information about risk, the closer to a "market" price the 
loan will be priced. Also, when risk is properly priced the bank's management can 
be more confident that they are holding a portfolio with the mix of risk that they 
desire. 
This section describes four methods that have been suggested to price the 
risk of bank loans. The first, measuring the default risk of a loan, uses specific 
information about a particular loan applicant to assess one aspect of risk--the 
13Risk is defined by the variance of the expected return around its mean. In other words, 
risk can be interpreted as volatility. 
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probability that the loan will not be repaid as scheduled. The second and third 
methods go beyond default risk and suggest how other risk factors such as 
maturity and industry-type can be measured and incorporated into the price of the 
loan. A final method discussed in this section uses bond market prices to assess 
the price of risk. 
Pricing Default <Credit) Risk 
Default risk is the probability that a borrower will not repay his/her loan 
under the terms initially agreed upon. Default risk, which is dependent on the 
borrower's characteristics, is determined in isolation of other loans in the bank's 
portfolio. Because many methods have been developed to measure default risk and 
are thoroughly discussed in the literature, only a few methods are briefly 
reviewed. 14 
Financial ratio analysis provided one of the earliest measurements of 
bankruptcy (and default) and remains a useful method of detecting operating and 
financial stress in firms. 15 Beaver (1967), for example, found that certain financial 
ratios exhibited significantly different measures when comparing healthy firms with 
firms experiencing financial difficulties. Moreover, certain financial ratios 
discriminated between matched samples of failed and nonfailed firms for up to five 
years prior to failure. Generalizing from several studies, the most helpful ratios 
14For a survey of bankruptcy and loan classification models, see Altman ( 1983) and Scott 
(1981). 
16See, for example, Altman (1968), Beaver (1967), Dietrich and Kaplan (1982), Libby 
(1975), and Smith and Winakor (1935). 
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were those that measured a firm's profitability, liquidity, and solvency.16 
The analysis of financial ratios has been enhanced by applying statistical 
techniques such as regression and multivariate discriminant analysis which consider 
interactive effects and groupings of variables. Two better known models of this 
type are the Z-score model and ZETA analysis. The Z-score model incorporates 
working capital/total assets, retained earnings/total assets, earnings before interest 
and taxes/total assets, market value equity/book value of total liabilities, and 
sales/total assets in a multivariate discriminant analysis to predict firms that are 
likely to go bankrupt. A study by Altman ( 1 983) indicates that the model predicted 
a sample of 33 firms with 95 percent accuracy when the financial ratios were 
tested one year before bankruptcy. The accuracy of the model fell to 36 percent, 
however, when the ratios were tested 5 years before bankruptcy. 
ZETA analysis, produced by Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977), 
improved the longer-term accuracy of the Z-score by successfully classifying 90 
percent of the sample firms one year prior to bankruptcy and 70 percent of the 
firms up to five years prior to bankruptcy. The ZETA model relies on the following 
seven variables: return on assets (earnings before interest and taxes/total assets), 
stability of earnings (normalized measure of the standard error of estimate around a 
1 0-year trend in the return on assets), debt service (earnings before interest and 
taxes/total interest payments), cumulative profitability (retained earnings/total 
181n practice, the set of ratios used often varies by the industry being analyzed. Moreover, 
the information content of ratios varies over time. Currently, leverage is a critical ratio as is 
interest and fixed charge coverage. Robert Morris Associates publishes an Annual Statement 
Studies, which summarizes the financial ratios from more than 95,000 financial statements. 
The statements are collected from banks and are categorized by the company's asset size and 
4-digit standard industrial code. 
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assets). liquidity (common equity/total capital),a nd size (total tangible assets). 
Although the above methods classify firms only into the two categories 
bankrupt and nonbankrupt, they provide meaningful insight into those variables that 
provide information about default. Dietrich and Kaplan (1982) extended the 
bankrupt/nonbankrupt categories by developing a model that computes a score that 
classifies loans into one of four mutually exclusive risk categories by using a debt-
equity ratio, a funds-flow-to-fixed-commitments ratio, and sales trends. In addition, 
Bierman and Hausman (1970) suggest a dynamic programming technique that 
indicates whether to offer credit to a customer based on a set of decision rules. 
After determining the risk rating or default probability of a loan, it can be 
incorporated into the price of the loan.17 A useful illustration is presented by 
Saunders (1987) in which he assumes a contract loan rate is determined by the 
risk-free and default rate. In this case, a profitable loan contract rate would be 
determined by the following formula: 
i. = [(1 +r)/( 1 -dl - 1 
where i. is a profitable loan contract rate, r is the risk-free nominal rate of interest, 
and d is the probability of default.18 Using the formula above and assuming a 
default probability of 1 percent and 2 percent, Table 8.3 indicates that the pricing is 
consistent financial theory which associates higher default probabilities (risk) with 
higher loan contract rates. Specifically, default risk increases as credit quality 
17Miller (1991 L Loan Pricing Corporation, used the cumulative seven-year default rate of 
Standard & Poor's bond default statistic as a proxy for the default rate for bank loans with 
comparable risk. 
1 8To determine the dollars that would be received for every $1 lent, the formula is simply 
1 + i" = ( 1 + r)/( 1-d). 













declines. Therefore, banks must be compensated for additional risk through higher 
loan contract rates. As discussed next, however, risks in addition to default should 
be considered in loan pricing. 
Subjectively Determine Areas of Risk and Apply Factors 
Buck (1979) suggests a framework for pricing loans that consists of 
identifying risks that effect loans and quantifying them in a manner that can be 
incorporated into pricing. Admittedly, the identification and quantification of risk 
under Buck's approach is subjective, but after the risks are identified and quantified, 
the risk factors can be mechanically applied to loans to create an overall risk 
premium. Some examples of the risks that might be identified are credit risk, 
maturity risk, collateral value risk, and commitment period rate risk. 
Once the underlying cause for the risk is identified, an associated premium 
factor can be determined. With regard to maturity risk, for example, longer loan 
maturity is associated with increased risk because time increases the possibility of 
changes in the borrower's credit strength or other events that might adversely 
affect the probability of loan repayment. According to Buck, maturity risk factors 
can be determined by using the yield curve in the bond market, or a straight-line 
premium can be computed, such as the one shown in Table B.4. 
With factor tables for each risk, the determination of a loan target price is 
straightforward. The factors are simply added as costs to the loan to determine the 
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contract loan price. Consequently, this method prices loans relative to risk, 
although the risks and associated factors are subjectively determined. 
Table 8.4: Maturity Risk 
Maturity Factor Maturity Factor Maturity Factor 
!Yrs.) 1.%1 � 00 � 00 
0-1 0 10 .94 19 1.88 
2 .1 0 11 1.04 20 1.98 
3 .21 12 1.15 21 2.08 
4 .31 13 1.25 22 2.19 
5 .42 14 1.35 23 2.29 
6 .52 15 1.46 24 2.40 
7 .63 16 1.56 25 2.50 
8 .73 17 1.67 
9 .83 18 1.77 
Source: Buck ( 1 979). 
A more objective approach would determine risks and associated factors by 
analyzing the similarities of many loans created by many banks. Most banks do not 
possess such detailed information; but as explained next, Loan Pricing Corporation 
(LPC) has compiled a loan databank that has enabled them to do such analysis. 
Pricing Matrix by Risk Factors 
The Loan Pricing Corporation developed a pricing matrix that goes a step 
beyond Buck's method by devising an objective system to determine the risk 
factors and associated premiums by which to price loans. LPC developed its pricing 
matrix by analyzing the similarities of over 6,000 commercial loans to borrowers 
with sales over $500 million. Although much of their data were obtained from 
Security and Exchange Commission filings, they also incorporated proprietary loan 
data from over 45 banks nationwide. 
LPC created its matrix by first using regression analysis to identify the 
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factors that explained the spread of the contract loan price from LIBOR. After 
controlling for a number of variables, they found that spread pricing was 
statistically significantly dependent on borrower's risk, annual sales size, and the 
estimated usage level on the loan. 19 Loans were also analyzed by characteristics 
such as type (secured vs. unsecured), geographic location, and industry. 
Essentially, the LPC method is similar to a multifactor capital asset pricing 
model where a sample of commercial loan "investments" have replaced the stock 
market portfolio. As a result, the LPC matrix identifies the premiums charged by 
banks for various risks and then uses these factors to identify the "market" price of 
a given transaction based on comparable deals. 20 
Pricing Loans Relative to Bonds 
The price/risk structure created by the bond market can be a valuable 
reference point to bankers in their pricing of commercial loans. Specifically, 
because the bond market incorporates default risk into its return, it creates a risk 
structure for interest rates. 
Maniktala ( 1991 l argues that risk measures that rely on bond market data 
are superior to those based on historical data for two main reasons. First, because 
historical data are imbedded in a past environment, their forecasting ability is 
impaired when future conditions change. In contrast, the yield of bond market data 
reflects the market's estimate of future performance for a particular risk category. 
19Earlier analysis by LPC indicated that commitment size also explained a significant portion 
of the LIBOR spread, but it was not included in their analysis because of its correlation with 
borrower sales. 
20Banks that purchase the LPC product are given personal computer software that enable 
them to compute a market loan price by entering into the program characteristics of the loan 
such as loan purpose as well as the firm's industry type, geographic location, and asset size. 
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Moreover, bond data change daily, reflecting the incorporation of new information 
about the future. Second, the availability and consistency of historical borrower-
specific data is slim because the risk-scoring systems of most banks have not been 
in place for a very long period. Bond market data, on the other hand, are readily 
available for long periods of time. 
Maniktala suggests the following three steps to price loans relative to the 
bond market. First, arrange annual corporate bond prices (available in The Wall 
Street Journal) by risk and maturity. Each risk-maturity combination should 
possess several bonds, while bonds with special option features should be 
excluded. Second, calculate the yield to maturity for each bond and the average 
yield for each risk-maturity combination. Finally, subtract the bank's cost of funds, 
represented by an adjusted secondary CD rate for an equivalent maturity, from each 
average yield to create the loan target. The resultant target, which shows the 
average return achievable in the public debt market for corporate bonds with an 
equivalent risk and maturity, can be used to determine the market-consistent return 
on bank loans that possess the same risk. 
Table 8.5 indicates how a bank's rating system might correlate with public 
bond ratings. For institutions using a 1 0-point risk rating system, a risk rating of 1 
may correspond with the bond market rating of AAA. 21 Thus, the average return 
of the bank's portfolio of class 1 risks should be 0.23 percent. 
2'Risk scores of 7 through 10 would be associated with bond ratings of CCC and below. 
Because these risk ratings represent problem credits, pricing is not a consideration. 
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Table 8.5: Average Target Loan Rates (Spread Over Secondary CDsl 
Market Returns (%) Bank's Comparable 
Risk Rating Fourth Quarter Risk-Rating 
� .1JW. � 
AAA 0.23 1 
AA 0.36 2 
A 0.61 3 
888 1.14 4 
88 3.07 5 
8 6.78 6 
Source: Maniktala (1991 ). 
An advantage of using the bond market to price loans is that it reminds 
decision makers of opportunity costs. Maniktala points out, for example, that a 
bank should not price the loan of a 888 risk company at LI80R + 75 basis points 
when it could synthetically create bonds with similar pricing characteristics of the 
same company yielding LI80R + 120. As such, this method also gives decision 
makers justification to deny loans in markets where competitive factors have driven 
loan prices too low. In addition, a market-driven pricing target should also improve 
customer negotiations since the prices are similar to those the customer would 
receive from the public markets. 
Differences between the markets for bonds and loans, however, limit a 
direct transfer of a bond price matrix to loan pricing. For example, the correlation 
between the risk scores of a bank and the risk scores of bond ratings are not 
always exact, particularly when dealing with small to middle market companies. 22 
Indeed, Goodhart (1987) and Murton (1989) point out that some firms borrow from 
221n fact, pricing relative to bonds is typically used for upper market loans. Moreover, 
merchant (transaction) banks would be more apt to use this pricing method. 
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banks because public information on their economic condition is so limited that 
alternative public financing is too expensive or not available. Finally, loans tend to 
possess stricter covenants but more flexibility with regard to repayment under 
default while bonds possess the advantage of being more liquid. 
Summary 
Many different types of specific risks effect commercial bank loans. 
Identifying and pricing these risks will enable a bank's loan pricing policies to more 
closely approximate the true market price and more efficiently allocate available 
funds. A final risk that must be considered in pricing is the general risk of loans 
relative to the bank's total loan portfolio. 
Portfolio Approach to Pricing 
Portfolio theory indicates that loans should be priced according to their risk­
return relationship with a bank's entire loan portfolio. This theory shows that when 
a loan that possesses a negatively correlated return with the bank's loan portfolio is 
added to the portfolio, it reduces the overall variability of returns to the portfolio 
because it acts as a hedge against movement in the rest of the portfolio. 23 
Consequently, negatively correlated loans should be priced lower than loans that 
are positively correlated to the portfolio, ceteris paribus. 
Mersman ( 1991) noted that "Commercial loan portfolio management is in an 
embryonic state in most commercial banks--contrary to what many bankers might 
believe." Indeed, applying portfolio theory to commercial bank loan pricing is 
difficult because it is hard to measure the risk and expected return of loans which 
23This theory is explained further in Chapter Ill, op cit., under portfolio pricing theory. 
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are needed to apply the model. Given these difficulties, the literature contains little 
practical application of portfolio theory to pricing commercial loans. As a result, 
this section reviews only one approach: measuring risk concentrations to adjust 
loan contract prices relative to its contribution to the portfolio's risk. 
Diversifiable and Nondiversifiable Risk 
Goodman (1981) considers the loans in a bank's portfolio to less developed 
countries (LOCI that are not members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). Because rate-of-return figures are not available, proxies are 
developed to estimate the country risk considerations that are assumed to affect 
the loan's rate of return. 
The proxies chosen to estimate country risk represent possible problems that 
may hinder a country's ability to repay its debts: growth in exports, money supply, 
international reserves, and the ratio of imports to reserves. For each proxy, a 
quarterly time series was compiled and an index for each proxy was constructed 
with each country weighted by its borrowing share. A regression was performed 
for each country as given by the equation: 
(8.1) X;= o; + [i;'5< + e; 
where ;'5<. represents the index for a given country risk measure, X; is the country 
risk measure X for country i, and O; and {i; are constants. The systematic or 
nondiversifiable variance for country i for a given risk measure is equal to the 
squared fi; constant from the regression times the variance of the index [(.B;a)2]. The 
nonsystematic or diversifiable variance is the squared standard error of the 
regression times (N-2)/N where N is the number of observations. 
Although this method presents an alternative to quantifying diversifiable and 
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nondiversifiable without using rate-of-return figures, it also has some drawbacks. 
First, bias may be introduced if measurement errors exist in the proxies. Second, 
although these measures may capture an ability to pay, they do not account for a 
willingness to pay. Finally, this method can be applied to only a small number of 
loans (non-OPEC LDCs) within a bank's portfolio. 
Although the next article reviewed was also written with global bank lending 
in mind, its application of portfolio theory possesses greater general application. 
Measuring Risk Concentrations 
Common underlying factors exist within every loan portfolio that cause 
changes in the financial status of many borrowers. As a result, a group of loans 
that react similarly to the same events can cause a bank's loan portfolio to act as if 
it contained just a few large loans. For this reason, identifying covariances among 
loans based on such factors as exchange rates and geographic concentration, is 
important to the diversification process because it highlights sources of risk to the 
portfolio. 24 
Bennett (1984) uses the concept of covariance and risk concentrations to 
create a method that takes into account the bank's current portfolio structure to 
guide future decisions in exposure and pricing. Bennett presents this method by 
using a hypothetical bank loan portfolio analyzed at the customer level. 
Specifically, his method identifies the current credit rating and exposure of each 
customer and then uses economic theory to consider the likely impact on customer 
ratings of different events such as a $1 0 drop in oil prices, a 2% slower growth 
2•1n addition, loan covariances might include interest rates, commodity prices, major local 
events, and particular stages of the business cycle. 
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rate of European countries, and a 25% depreciation of the dollar. This portion of 
the analysis identifies borrowers that are sensitive to a common set of events and 
thus indicates where the portfolio's risks are concentrated by showing how each 
event would affect the quality of the loan portfolio. 25 
The result of the event analysis can be condensed into a single portfolio risk 
measure by giving specific value weights to the proportion of the portfolio in each 
risk category. The value weights reflect the notion that negative events will have a 
more adverse affect on the ability of weak credits to service debt than on that of 
strong credits. Moreover, a portfolio risk contribution index value can be created 
for each loan by considering whether the loan intensifies or mitigates the impact of 
each event on the bank's entire loan portfolio. Each borrower's portfolio risk 
contribution index value can then be used to guide future pricing. 26 For example, 
a borrower that contributes significantly to portfolio risk should be charged a price 
higher than the standard markup for its risk rating while a borrower that hedges the 
portfolio risk should be priced lower than the standard markup. 
Summary 
The portfolio approach encourages a bank to take a broader perspective and 
view individual credits in light of their affect on overall bank profitability rather than 
the profit on an isolated transaction. Moreover, pricing loans based on a portfolio 
approach implicitly rations credit to highly risky candidates. Specifically, if a bank 
is highly concentrated in an industry with a particular earnings pattern, then 
26Chirinko and Guill ( 1 991) suggest a more sophisticated method that uses macroeconomic 
and input/output models to estimate loan losses associated with specific events. 
28The price related to the risk contribution value is added to the price which reflects its 
original risk rating. 
additional firms with the same earnings pattern could be charged a higher loan 
contract price while firms possessing opposite earnings patterns (yet the same 
default rate) would be charged a lower contract rate. 
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The portfolio approach is not without its problems, however. This approach 
is difficult to implement because the expected return on bank loans is difficult to 
determine given the many factors that are represented in the price of a loan. Also, 
like other statistical methods, a portfolio approach to pricing loans cannot fully 
substitute for the informed judgement of individual lending officers or credit 
analysts, but should be used in a supplemental manner. 
APPENDIX C 
PRESENTATION OF GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARE RESULTS 
The following tables replicate the tests shown in Chapter 5, but generalized 
least squares (GLS) is used rather than ordinary least squares (OLS). As noted in 
Chapter 5, most of the OLS regressions tested positively for heteroscedasticity. 
The data are not corrected for heteroskedasticity, however, because the nonnested 
J-test and Cox-text were created for OLS regression results. In addition, parameter 
estimates remain unbiased and consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity, 
even though they are inefficient. For the interested reader, however, GLS results 
are shown here. 
The Park-Giejser statistic, which results from these tests is not used to 
weight the data. Rather, in order to use the same weighting system for all of the 
models, the variables are transformed by dividing them by the amount of the loan. 1 
Because the data in this chapter are transformed by the original amount of the loan, 
the coefficients should be interpreted with caution. The coefficients reflect the 
mean expected return per dollar amount of the loan relative to the ratio of the 
independent variable in question per dollar amount of the loan. 
11t is necessary to use the same weighting system for all models because the dependent 
variables on the competing models must be the same in order to assess the relative explanatory 
power of the independent variables associated with each model. 
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Table C.1: Generalized Least Squares (Heteroscedastic Consistent! Results where the 
Dependent Variable is the Expected Return on the Loan, T-Statistics in Parenthesis 




Theory Rationing H,K&M She me 
A* 1.683580 0.841012 4.941727 5.312480 







Intercept -0.000000 -0.000000 -0.000001 -0.000001 
(-14.23)* (-2.15)** (-2.81 )* (-3.29)* 
M -0.000911 -0.002669 -0.003012 -0.003036 













Adjusted R2 0.67 0.80 0.45 0.45 
F-Statistic 673.41 * 1647.60* 276.50* 446.11* 
• Significant at the 1 percent level. 
• • Significant at the 5 percent level. 
• • • Significant at the 10 percent level. 
A • = 1 /A due to generalized least squares transformation. 
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Table C.2: Results of J-Test: Predicted Values for Re-estimated Equations, T-Statistics in Parenthesis 
Dependent Variable: Expected Return on Loans 
H0: Credit Rationing 
H,: H,K&M Customer Relationship 
H0: H,K&M Customer Relationship 
H,: Credit Rationing 
• Significant at the 1 percent level. 
• • Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Table C.3: Results of Cox Test (q Statistic) 
Predicted Values for: 






Dependent Variable: Expected Return on Loans 
H0: Credit Rationing 
H,: H,K&M Customer Relationship 
H0: H,K&M Customer Relationship 
H,: Credit Rationing 




Table C.4: Reconsidering the Portfolio Theory Specification Generalized Least Squares 
(Heteroscedastic Consistent) Results, T-Statistics in Parenthesis (Observations = 
1,670) 
De(lend�nt Vari§!bl�s 
Ex(lect�d R�turn Premium Premium Exll�£1�!;! R�t!.lrn 
A* 1.683580 1.357528 2.905803 4.852976 
(34.24)* (34.11). (12.10)* (17.50)* 
VAR -0.012331 0.0046077 
(-28.70)* (13.25). 
VAR2 0.000002 0.000011 
(-1.63)* (10.05)* 
RISK 0.4791333 -0.0271419 
(7.77)* (-0.37) 
CORA -1.504214 -1.491842 -0.0819936 -0.3929100 
(-8.33) (-10.20) (-0.28) (-1.14) 
Intercept -0.000000 -0.000000 -0.000001 -0.000001 
(-14.23)* (-17.16)* (-3.30)* (-3.32)* 
MATURITY -0.000911 0.000214 -0.000957 -0.003079 
(-17.69)* (5.12)* (-13.30)* (-36.07)* 
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.41 0.14 0.44 
F-Statistic 673.41* 228.58* 66.61* 331.99* 
• Significant at the 1 percent level. 
• 
• Significant at the 5 percent level. 
• 
• • Significant at the 1 0 percent level. 
A • = 1 /A due to generalized least squares transformation. 
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Table C.5: Portfolio Theory: Results of Generalized Least Squares (Heteroscedastic Consistent) by 
Loan Size where the Dependent Variable is the Expected Return on the Loan, T-Statistics 
in Parenthesis 
Loan Size 
> =$1 Million < $1 Million 
A• 1.605442 3.331680 
(10.00)0 (44.20)0 
VAR 0.001954 -0.014471 
(0.62) (-37.94)0 
VAR2 -0.000030 -0.000006 
(-3.8W (-6.98)0 
CORR -0.807830 1.434785 
(-1.36) (6.43)• 
Intercept -0.000000 -0.000001 
(-2.59) •  ( -1 2.63). 
M -0.807830 -0.000976 
(-1 .36) (-14.65)• 
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.59 
F-Statistic 59.12. 402.06° 
Observations 257 1413 
• Significant at the 1 percent level. 
• • Significant at the 5 percent level. 
• • • Significant at the 1 0 percent level. 
A • = 1 /A due to generalized least squares transformation. 
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Tabla C.6: Credit Rationing: Results of Generalized least Squares (Hataroscedastic Consistent) by 
loan Size where the Dependant Variable is the Expected Return on the loan, T­
Statistics in Parenthesis 
Loan Size 
> = $1 Million < $1 Million 
A• -7.079922 1.171030 
(-6.02)• (2.29)• 
RATE 2.527107 0.094720 
(5.99)• (0.94) 
RATE2 -0.154076 0.038061 
(-4.27)• (8.18)• 
Intercept -0.000000 -0.000000 
(1.05) (-3.66)• 
M -0.003358 -0.002651 
(-20.51)' (-46.93). 
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.80 
F-Statistic 64.40· 1405.90• 
Observations 257 1413 
• Significant at the 1 percent level. 
• • Significant at the 5 percent level. 
• • • Significant at the 1 0 percent level. 
A • = 1 /A due to generalized least squares transformation. 
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Table C.7: Customer Relationship (H,K&M): Results of Generalized Least Squares (Heteroscedastic 




> = $1 Million < $1 Million 
A• 1.590129 4.976604 
(1 0.35)• (55.17)• 
GROWTH -0.001848 -0.006279 
(-0.43) (-2.86)• 
DEPOSITS -0.000000 -0.000001 
(-2.06)•. (-2.33) •• 
TIME -0.000062 -0.000041 
(-1.74) .. . (-1.96) .. 
Intercept -0.000000 -0.000001 
(-1.72) . . . (-4.69)• 
M -0.002508 -0.002969 
(-13.62)• (-31.70)• 
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.46 
F-Statistic 42.33. 240.01. 
Observations 257 1410 
• Significant at the 1 percent level. 
• • Significant at the 5 percent level. 
• • • Significant at the 1 0 percent level. 
A • = 1/A due to generalized least squares transformation. 
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Table C.S: Customer Relationship (Sharpe): Results of Generalized Least Squares (Heteroscadastic 
Consistent) where the Dependent Variable Is the Expected Return on Loan, T-Statistics In 
Parenthesis 
> = $1 Million 
A• 3.144442 
(6.15)• 
Log (TIME) -0.210364 
(-3.12)• 
Intercept -0.000000 
(-2.01 , •• 
M -0.002428 
(-13.49)• 
Adjusted R2 0.44 
F-Statistic 67.55• 
Observations 257 
• Significant at the 1 percent level. 
• • Significant at the 5 percent level. 
• • • Significant at the 1 0 percent level. 
A • = 1/A due to generalized least squares. 
Loan Amount 
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